Libby ADR https://libbyadr.com Wed, 18 Nov 2026 20:11:53 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=7.1.5 https://libbyadr.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/cropped-2026-01-22_17-10-32x32.png Libby ADR https://libbyadr.com 32 32 FCA Case Spotlight: The Fifth Circuit Holds That the Government Needs Only a Legally Sufficient Reason to Intervene Late and Dismiss a Declined Qui Tam, and Two Judges Question Riley https://libbyadr.com/fca-case-spotlight-jackson-v-united-states-government-dismissal/ https://libbyadr.com/fca-case-spotlight-jackson-v-united-states-government-dismissal/#respond Wed, 18 Nov 2026 20:11:53 +0000 https://libbyadr.com/?p=1725 United States ex rel. Jackson v. United States, No. 24-40564, ___ F.4th ___, 2026 WL 3454267 (5th Cir. Nov. 13, 2026) | United States ex rel. Jackson v. Ventavia Research Group, LLC, 744 F. Supp. 3d 676 (E.D. Tex. 2024) | United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc., 599 U.S. 419 (2023) | Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, 252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc)

Healthcare / False Claims Act · Government Intervention and Dismissal (§3730(c)) · Retaliation (§3730(h)) · Constitutionality of the Qui Tam Provisions

Introduction and Executive Summary

In United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc., 599 U.S. 419 (2023) (Polansky), the Supreme Court held that the government may intervene and move to dismiss, over the relator’s objections, after declining at the seal stage, and that a court should judge the dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41, which governs voluntary dismissals. Polansky also drew separate opinions questioning whether the qui tam device is constitutional at all, a question the Eleventh Circuit took up in September in United States ex rel. Zafirov v. Florida Medical Associates, LLC, 190 F.4th 1298 (11th Cir. 2026) (Zafirov).

On November 13, 2026, in United States ex rel. Jackson v. United States (Jackson), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied Polansky to a qui tam alleging that data from Pfizer Inc.’s Phase III COVID-19 vaccine trial were fabricated, a case the government moved to dismiss more than two years after it declined to intervene. The court affirmed and made four rulings. First, the government needed only “good cause” to intervene late, a flexible standard meaning a legally sufficient reason, and did not also have to satisfy Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, because no defendant had answered or moved for summary judgment, the government was entitled to dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1), and the district court’s only role was to ensure that the relator had notice and a hearing and that the dismissal did not violate the Constitution. Third, the dismissal was properly with prejudice as to the relator. Fourth, the government’s dismissal did not reach the relator’s FCA retaliation claim, but that claim failed because her internal complaints were about regulatory compliance, not fraud on the government. Judge Willett, who wrote for the panel, and Chief Judge Elrod, who wrote separately, each questioned whether Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, 252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Riley), which upheld the qui tam provisions 25 years ago, should stand.

Background Facts

The vaccine trial and the relator

Pfizer ran its Phase III COVID-19 vaccine trial through contract sites, including three operated by Ventavia Research Group, LLC (Ventavia). Ventavia conducted the clinical procedures, collected the data, kept the records, and performed site quality-control checks under Pfizer’s protocols and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Good Clinical Practice guidelines. Pfizer also hired Icon PLC (Icon), a clinical research organization, to manage the trial. Jackson at *2.

Shortly after Pfizer agreed to supply the government with 100 million doses of an approved or authorized vaccine, Ventavia hired Brook Jackson as a regional clinical-trial director responsible for testing sites, patient recruitment, training, and quality assurance. She lasted about two weeks. During that time, she became concerned about protocol deviations and regulatory violations, recommended pausing enrollment, and repeatedly raised her concerns with her supervisors. She then told FDA that the sites were not operating as regulators expected. Ventavia fired her the same day, saying she was not a “good fit,” and resumed enrollment the next day. Id. FDA authorized the vaccine for emergency use on December 11, 2020, and approved it for people sixteen and older on August 23, 2021. United States ex rel. Jackson v. Ventavia Research Group, LLC, 744 F. Supp. 3d 676, 683 (E.D. Tex. 2024) (Ventavia).

The qui tam and the government’s declination

Jackson filed her qui tam under seal on January 8, 2021, asserting presentment and false-record claims against Pfizer, Icon, and Ventavia, and an FCA retaliation claim against Ventavia. On January 18, 2022, the government declined to intervene, but it expressly reserved its right to intervene later for good cause and to seek dismissal. When the defendants moved to dismiss, the government filed a statement of interest supporting them. On March 31, 2023, the district court dismissed the FCA claims with prejudice and the retaliation claim without prejudice. Ventavia at 683–84.

The district court then allowed Jackson to amend. Her second amended complaint, filed October 5, 2023, added a fraudulent-inducement theory: that Pfizer’s submissions to FDA contained fabricated or manipulated data and left out serious adverse events, that FDA would not have authorized the vaccine had it known, and that the government’s later purchases of doses were therefore false claims. She repleaded the retaliation claim in nearly identical terms and added a retaliation claim under Texas law. Jackson at *2–3; Ventavia at 684.

The government steps back in

The defendants moved to dismiss again. On March 12, 2024, the government moved to intervene for the purpose of dismissing the case. It argued that the claims lacked merit, rested on “misinformation,” and ran counter to public-health policy, and that continuing the litigation would impose discovery and monitoring burdens on FDA, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). After a three-hour hearing, the district court granted the motion on August 9, 2024, dismissing the FCA claims with prejudice as to Jackson and without prejudice as to the government. It dismissed the federal retaliation claim with prejudice, declined to hear the Texas claim, and denied leave to amend a third time. It did not decide whether the FCA claims would also have failed on the merits. Jackson at *3, *7 n.41, *8; Ventavia at 684.

Legal Analysis

1. Late intervention and “good cause”

  • The government did not have to satisfy Rule 24(b) to intervene late. After the seal period, the FCA allows the government to intervene “upon a showing of good cause,” 31 U.S.C. §3730(c)(3), but does not say what good cause means. Jackson argued that the government also had to meet Rule 24(b), the rule for permissive intervention, which requires a common question of law or fact and asks whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the original parties. The government argued that only the statute applies. The court agreed with the government. It reasoned that the statute contains none of Rule 24(b)’s requirements; that the government, which owns the claim, is not an ordinary intervenor, so a common question is always present; that a relator is only a partial assignee of the government’s claim; and that Polansky discussed intervention without mentioning Rule 24(b). For the meaning of good cause, the court relied on Polansky’s approving quotation of the Third Circuit: “a uniquely flexible and capacious concept, meaning simply a legally sufficient reason.” Jackson at *3–4 (quoting Polansky at 429 n.2). The court added that the result would be the same under Rule 24, because Jackson always knew the government might come back in, discovery had been stayed, and the motion came about a year and a half before trial. Jackson at *4–5 n.31.
  • Each of the government’s three reasons was good cause. The government gave three reasons for intervening: the burdens of discovery and of monitoring the case, its doubts about the merits, and its view that the litigation conflicted with public-health policy. The court held that each was a legally sufficient reason, because each mirrored reasons other circuits had accepted. It noted that the district court had recognized the discovery burden even before the government moved, when it stayed discovery after Pfizer represented that discovery would be “exceptionally burdensome” and would “fall on the United States as well.” Jackson at *5.
  • The court rejected Jackson’s other objections to intervention. Jackson argued that the district court had blurred the standards for intervention and dismissal; the court answered that the two are often intertwined and that courts after Polansky routinely treat a motion to dismiss as including a request to intervene. She argued that the government had to support its reasons with affidavits and that the court had to make specific findings; the court held that nothing in the statute or Polansky requires either. She argued that late intervention requires changed circumstances; the court found no such requirement in the statute or in DOJ’s 2018 Granston Memorandum, and noted that circumstances had changed anyway, because she had filed a new complaint with a new theory. And she argued that letting the government intervene to dismiss undermines the purpose of the FCA; the court answered that Congress empowered relators to proceed when the government declines to act, not to override the government when it does act. Id. at *5–7.

2. Dismissal under Rule 41

  • Because no defendant had answered, the government was entitled to dismissal. Under Polansky, a government dismissal under §3730(c)(2)(A) is governed by Rule 41, modified only by the FCA’s requirement that the relator receive notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Jackson argued that the government had to give a “reasonable argument for why the burdens of continued litigation outweigh its benefits,” a phrase she took from Polansky. The court held that the phrase applies only after a defendant has answered or moved for summary judgment, when Rule 41(a)(2) governs, and that even then the standard is highly deferential. Here no defendant had answered, so Rule 41(a)(1) governed. In that posture, the court said, “Rule 41 entitles the [Government] to a dismissal,” and “the district court has no adjudicatory role” beyond ensuring notice and a hearing, subject to “bedrock constitutional constraints.” Following its own decision in Vanderlan v. United States, 135 F.4th 257 (5th Cir. 2025) (Vanderlan), the court held that a district court may not deny such a dismissal absent a constitutional problem or some extraordinary circumstance. Jackson at *7–8 & n.54.
  • A hearing on the briefs would have been enough. Jackson argued that she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because she had shown a “substantial and particularized need,” relying on a 1986 Senate Report describing proposed amendments that would have given relators that right. The court held that Congress did not adopt that proposal and enacted only an “opportunity for a hearing,” which, under Vanderlan, a hearing on the briefs satisfies. In any event, the district court had held a three-hour hearing, questioned both sides, and accepted Jackson’s affidavits. Her constitutional objections, under the First Amendment, the separation of powers, equal protection, and substantive due process, did not change the result. Jackson at *8–9.
  • The dismissal was properly with prejudice as to Jackson. Rule 41 dismissals are ordinarily without prejudice, but the rule allows a dismissal with prejudice when the notice says so. The government’s proposed order asked for it, and the court reasoned that a dismissal without prejudice would undercut the government’s right to dismiss if the relator could simply refile. Because it affirmed the dismissal, the court did not reach the defendants’ alternative arguments on the merits. Id. at *7 n.41, *9–10.

3. The retaliation claim

  • The government’s dismissal did not reach the retaliation claim. The court agreed with the district court that the government’s power to dismiss “the action” under §3730(c)(2)(A) refers to the qui tam brought in the government’s name. A retaliation claim under §3730(h) is the relator’s own claim, with its own elements and remedies, and it protects interests separate from the government’s. Jackson forfeited any challenge to the dismissal of her Texas claim by not briefing it. Id. at *10 nn.69–70.
  • Complaints about protocol deviations were not protected activity. Ventavia argued, and the district court held, that Jackson had not alleged protected activity. To be protected, an employee’s conduct must be motivated by a concern about fraud on the government, and internal complaints qualify only if they concern false or fraudulent claims for payment. The court affirmed, noting the Supreme Court’s caution that the FCA is not “an all-purpose antifraud statute” or a vehicle for punishing “regulatory violations.” Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176, 194 (2016) (quoting Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008)). Jackson’s complaints, as pleaded, were about protocol deviations and regulatory noncompliance, and she did not allege that she told FDA about fraud on the government. The district court had flagged that gap in its first dismissal, and her only change in the amended complaint was to replace “as a result of” with “because.” Jackson at *11–12 & n.78.
  • Without protected activity, knowledge and causation failed too. An employer must know that the employee’s reports concern fraud on the government, not just misconduct or noncompliance. Jackson did not allege that she told anyone at Ventavia she suspected fraud; she alleged that she feared Ventavia would receive warning letters or be told to stop enrollment. The court acknowledged that firing her the same day she called FDA was “suspicious,” but noted that she did not allege Ventavia knew of the call when it fired her. Because she had not meaningfully changed her allegations after being told what was missing, dismissal with prejudice was proper. Id. at *12.

4. The concurrences

  • Judge Willett questioned whether Riley was rightly decided. No party raised the constitutionality of the qui tam provisions, and the panel was bound by Riley, in which a divided en banc Fifth Circuit upheld them. But Judge Willett, who wrote the panel opinion, wrote separately to say he has “serious doubts” that Riley was right, and that this case shows why: the plaintiff in name was not the plaintiff in fact, and the government had to ask a court’s permission to take back a case brought in its own name, and then defend that ruling on appeal. Jackson at *13 (Willett, J., concurring).
  • He found the Appointments Clause question close. Judge Willett concluded that a relator exercises significant federal authority, pointing to the size of recent judgments in declined cases, including the $1.64 billion judgment in United States ex rel. Penelow v. Janssen Products, LP, No. 12-7758, 2025 WL 937504 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2025), now on appeal in the Third Circuit. Whether a relator holds a “continuing position,” the other half of the test for an officer, he called the closer question. He respectfully disagreed with Zafirov’s holding that a relator’s role is “occasional and temporary,” citing qui tam cases that span administrations or outlive the original relator, but he did not resolve the question. Jackson at *13–16 (Willett, J., concurring).
  • He found the Vesting and Take Care Clause problem stronger. Relying on Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 219 (2020), which described suing for monetary penalties on behalf of the United States as “a quintessentially executive power,” Judge Willett wrote that a relator wields that power with no presidential supervision. A relator is not bound by DOJ policy, owes the government no fiduciary duty, and answers to no executive official unless the government gets permission to intervene. He noted that three Justices have questioned the qui tam device, and that within the Fifth Circuit, Judge Smith dissented in Riley and Judges Ho and Duncan have since called for it to be reconsidered. He closed: “Riley binds us today. Whether it binds us tomorrow is for the en banc court.” Jackson at *16–23 (Willett, J., concurring).
  • Chief Judge Elrod agreed that the question deserves the full court’s attention. Chief Judge Elrod joined the panel opinion in full and wrote briefly that Judge Willett’s concerns “are no doubt en banc worthy” and that, “[i]n a proper case, it may be time for our en banc court to revisit” Riley. Id. at *23 (Elrod, C.J., concurring).

Holding

The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in full: the order allowing the government to intervene under §3730(c)(3); the dismissal of the FCA claims under §3730(c)(2)(A), with prejudice as to Jackson; and the dismissal with prejudice of her §3730(h) retaliation claim against Ventavia for failure to state a claim. Jackson at *13.

What to Watch

  • Whether the Fifth Circuit reconsiders Riley en banc. Two members of this panel, including the Chief Judge, now join Judges Ho and Duncan in questioning Riley. Jackson itself is an unlikely vehicle, because no party raised the issue. Chief Judge Elrod’s phrase “in a proper case” points to a future appeal in which a defendant has preserved the challenge.
  • The same question in other circuits. On remand in Zafirov, the district court will take up the Vesting and Take Care Clause arguments the Eleventh Circuit left open. In the Second Circuit, a petition for permission to appeal the question is pending in United States ex rel. Barnes v. HealthNow New York, Inc., No. 26-2620 (2d Cir.). And the Third Circuit’s decision in Penelow, argued March 18, 2026, could come any week. A split among the circuits, or an en banc Fifth Circuit decision departing from Riley, would put the question squarely before the Supreme Court.
  • How the government uses its dismissal power. Together, Jackson and Vanderlan leave very little for a district court to review when the government moves to dismiss before an answer. Whether other circuits read Polansky the same way, and how often DOJ invokes the power in declined cases, remain to be seen.

What This Means for Resolving Declined Qui Tam Cases

In a declined case, the government is still in the room even when it is not at the table. Jackson shows how little stands in the way of a government dismissal before an answer is filed. A statement of interest supporting dismissal, like the one the government filed here, narrows the range of outcomes considerably.

The retaliation claim travels separately. Because the government’s dismissal does not reach it, an employee’s §3730(h) claim can outlive the qui tam and become the part of the dispute that remains to be resolved. Its value depends on the pleading: complaints framed as regulatory or protocol concerns, without a link to fraud on the government, did not state a claim here.

The concurrences add one more variable. Until the en banc Fifth Circuit or the Supreme Court resolves the constitutional question, a declined case in which the defendant has preserved the challenge carries the possibility that the relator’s authority to proceed will itself be in doubt. An open question of that kind tends to widen the gap between the parties’ valuations, and gives the party that expects to benefit from the answer a reason to wait.

John Libby is an arbitrator, mediator, and settlement counsel with LibbyADR LLC. This post contains his own summaries of the decisions discussed, prepared for general informational purposes only. The summaries are not intended to be a complete statement of any court’s reasoning, nor should they be taken to indicate how he would rule as an arbitrator in any particular case. In addition, the summaries are not legal advice, nor should they be construed as legal advice. Readers should not act on these posts, but should review the decisions themselves and consult with legal counsel.

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FCA Alert: Medical Necessity, Best Price, and 340B Diversion — Three District Courts Decline to End FCA Disputes on the Papers https://libbyadr.com/fca-alert-pomona-valley-sheldon-tsahas/ https://libbyadr.com/fca-alert-pomona-valley-sheldon-tsahas/#respond Wed, 18 Nov 2026 20:11:53 +0000 https://libbyadr.com/?p=1727 United States v. Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center, No. EDCV 22-1955 JGB (SPx), 2026 WL 3374163 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2026) | United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan Sales, LLC, No. ELH-14-2535, 2026 WL 3319407 (D. Md. Nov. 3, 2026) | Tsahas v. Community Foundation Northwest Indiana, Inc., No. 2:21-cv-279-AZ, 2026 WL 3341426 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 5, 2026)

Healthcare / False Claims Act · Medical-Necessity Certifications · Medicaid Best Price · §1292(b) Certification · §3730(h) Retaliation and 340B Diversion

Introduction and Executive Summary

Defendants in False Claims Act (FCA) cases often argue that some questions should be answered before discovery begins: whether a physician’s judgment about treatment can be “false” at all, what an ambiguous payment statute actually requires, and whether an employee’s internal complaint was about fraud or only about compliance. The authority those arguments run into has been building for several years. In Winter ex rel. United States v. Gardens Regional Hospital & Medical Center, Inc., 953 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2020) (Winter), the Ninth Circuit held that the FCA carves out no exception for clinical judgments and opinions. In United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., 598 U.S. 739 (2023) (Schutte), the Supreme Court held that FCA scienter turns on what the defendant actually knew and believed, not on what an objectively reasonable person might have thought. And in United States ex rel. Adventist Health System of West v. AbbVie Inc., 169 F.4th 1137 (9th Cir. 2026) (Adventist), the Ninth Circuit held that the 340B Program’s administrative remedies do not prevent an aggrieved covered entity from bringing 340B-related FCA claims. In the first week of November 2026, three federal district courts applied that authority, and in each case the dispute moved on toward discovery or trial rather than ending on the pleadings.

First, on November 6, 2026, in United States v. Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center (Pomona Valley), the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California held that a relator plausibly alleged that two radiation oncologists falsely certified the medical necessity of radiation therapy for elderly cancer patients, and that the hospital where they practiced acted with at least reckless disregard. It dismissed, with leave to amend, a reverse false claims count that it found merely repackaged the main claims, along with a California Insurance Fraud Prevention Act claim. Second, on November 3, 2026, in United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan Sales, LLC (Sheldon), the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland refused to certify for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) its order declining to entertain a third pre-discovery motion to dismiss in a twelve-year-old Medicaid “Best Price” case. It held that neither the meaning of the Medicaid Rebate Statute nor the timing of the court’s ruling on it was a controlling question of law fairly included in that order. Third, on November 5, 2026, in Tsahas v. Community Foundation Northwest Indiana, Inc. (Tsahas), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana denied summary judgment on a hospital pharmacy director’s FCA retaliation claim under 31 U.S.C. §3730(h). It held that a jury must decide whether her complaints about 340B “diversion” were protected activity, whether the hospital knew of them, and whether its stated reasons for firing her were pretext. Her state-law defamation claim also goes to the jury.

Background Facts

Pomona Valley: the radiation oncology allegations

Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center is a nonprofit, 412-bed community medical center in Southern California with a cancer care center. Dr. Alaa Latif, a medical oncologist who formerly practiced at the hospital, filed a qui tam action on November 4, 2022, against the hospital and two radiation oncologists who practice at its cancer center. Pomona Valley at *1. The court dismissed the original complaint with leave to amend on July 9, 2026, and Dr. Latif filed a second amended complaint on August 24, 2026. It asserted presentment and false-statement claims under 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1)(A) and (B), a reverse false claims count under §3729(a)(1)(G) against the hospital, and claims under the California False Claims Act and the California Insurance Fraud Prevention Act. Id. at *1–2.

Dr. Latif alleged that, since at least 2016, the two physicians persuaded elderly and vulnerable cancer patients to undergo medically unnecessary radiation, falsely certified on CMS-1500 claim forms that the treatment was “medically indicated and necessary,” and made similar representations to Medi-Cal and private insurers. Id. at *2–3. He offered six patient examples. One was a 77-year-old hospice patient eligible only for palliative radiation who, according to the complaint, was taken off hospice, given radiation billed as cancer treatment, and returned to hospice without follow-up. Several were patients with Stage 1 estrogen-receptor-positive breast cancer whose tumors had been removed by lumpectomy and who, according to the physicians’ own notes as alleged, met the National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN) criteria for omitting radiation. Another was a brain-tumor patient treated with radiation without a biopsy, cerebrospinal fluid cytology, or systemic imaging to confirm the diagnosis. Id. at *4–9, *13.

As to the hospital, Dr. Latif alleged that it paid physicians based on the revenue they generated, that the two radiation oncologists received a percentage of the hospital’s revenue from their patients, and that he and other oncologists repeatedly objected to the treatment plans at weekly oncology meetings attended by the hospital’s vice president of administration and an administrative director. He also alleged that he gave the hospital written patient complaints and that the hospital did not report or return the resulting overpayments within 60 days. Id. at *9–10. The physicians moved to dismiss for failure to plead falsity, materiality, and presentment. The hospital moved to dismiss for failure to plead scienter and falsity with the particularity Rule 9(b) requires, and argued that the reverse false claims count merely repackaged the others. Id. at *11.

Sheldon: twelve years, two dismissals, and a remand

Troy Sheldon, a former employee of Forest Laboratories, filed the case under seal in August 2014. After his death in 2017, his wife, Deborah Sheldon, as executrix of his estate, was substituted as relator; Allergan Sales, LLC (Allergan) is the successor to the Forest entities. Sheldon at *1 & n.2. The theory is that Forest “stacked” rebates and discounts to different customers on the same drug, but reported its Best Price under the Medicaid Rebate Statute, 42 U.S.C. §1396r-8, using only the largest single discount. In the Fourth Circuit’s illustration, Forest gave a 15% rebate to a care facility’s pharmacy provider and an additional 18% rebate to the patient’s private insurer on the same drug for the same patient. The complaint alleges that, between 2005 and 2014, Forest defrauded the government and the states of more than $680 million. Id. at *2–4.

The United States and the states declined to intervene in 2019. The district court dismissed the case in 2020 on the ground that Allergan’s reading of the statute was objectively reasonable; a divided Fourth Circuit panel affirmed, and an equally divided en banc court affirmed again. After the Supreme Court decided Schutte, it vacated and remanded, and in 2024 the district court dismissed a second time, finding the Best Price provisions ambiguous and holding that the relator had pleaded neither scienter nor falsity. Id. at *4–6. On March 13, 2026, a divided Fourth Circuit panel reversed in United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan Sales, LLC, 170 F.4th 227 (4th Cir. 2026) (Sheldon VII), holding that the relator plausibly alleged that Forest was subjectively aware of a substantial risk that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) read the statute to require aggregation. Because falsity is an objective inquiry, it remanded the question of what the statute actually requires to the district court “for consideration in the first instance.” Sheldon at *6–7 & n.4.

On remand, Allergan asked to file a third motion to dismiss, limited to falsity as a matter of law and Rule 9(b). The district court declined on May 7, 2026, and denied reconsideration on June 29, 2026, United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan Sales, LLC, No. ELH-14-2535, 2026 WL 1868781 (D. Md. June 29, 2026), reasoning that a third motion would unduly prolong the case and that the statute could be interpreted at summary judgment on a fuller record. (That ruling was the subject of my August 6, 2026 Case Spotlight.) The court entered a scheduling order on July 23, 2026, and discovery began. Allergan then moved under §1292(b) to certify the June 29 order for interlocutory appeal. Sheldon at *7–8.

Tsahas: the pharmacy director and the physician network

Kiriaki Koula Tsahas was pharmacy director at St. Catherine Hospital in East Chicago, Indiana, part of Community Foundation of Northwest Indiana, from 1997 until 2019, and helped run the hospital’s 340B Program. Her July 2019 performance review scored her 36 out of 37 and noted her 340B expertise. Tsahas at *1–2. As the court explained, a covered entity may not transfer or resell 340B drugs to individuals who are not its patients, a practice known as “diversion.” Id. at *2.

St. Catherine’s CEO also chaired the board of 219 Health Network, a separate physician organization. Beginning in mid-2019, there were efforts to have 219 Health Network patients’ prescriptions filled through St. Catherine’s 340B Program. Outside counsel prepared a July 2, 2019 memorandum raising questions about the arrangement’s feasibility and legality, and on July 12, 2019, 219 Health Network told the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) that St. Catherine would be its contract pharmacy beginning October 1, 2019. The formal pharmacy agreement was not signed until January 2020. Id. at *2.

In the fall of 2019, the hospital’s CFO noticed a spike in pharmacy costs, and the parties’ accounts of what followed diverge. According to the hospital, Tsahas admitted that a staff member had shortened the 340B eligibility lookback period from 365 days to 30 days without authorization. According to Tsahas, she denied any change, attributed the costs to prescriptions from 219 Health Network physicians that could not qualify, and was told by the CEO on October 15 to qualify those patients or “I’ll find another director who will.” Id. at *3–4. Human resources interviewed her for two hours on October 23 (she recorded the meeting), and, according to the defendants, they made the decision to suspend her that day, although the record is unclear about who made it, and she was not told.

On October 25 Tsahas received a state caregiver award, with her supervisor speaking at the ceremony. On October 26 she filed an ethics-hotline complaint alleging that the CEO had threatened to fire her unless she did something that “would have resulted in a diversion finding.” A corrective-action notice suspending her was signed on October 28; she was escorted out of the building on October 30 and fired on November 12, 2019, for “failure to follow approval processes.” Id. at *5–7. A later audit found instances of over-qualified prescriptions, and a May 2020 self-report to HRSA referred to terminating the pharmacists responsible for compliance. Id. at *7, *18.

Tsahas sued for FCA retaliation under §3730(h) and for defamation under Indiana law. The parties consented to magistrate-judge jurisdiction, and the court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on September 30, 2026, with this opinion following on November 5, 2026. Id. at *1.

Legal Analysis

1. Pomona Valley: whether a clinical judgment can be false

  • A medical-necessity certification can be false for the same reasons any opinion can be. The physicians and the hospital moved to dismiss on falsity. The hospital argued that Dr. Latif alleged only reasonable disagreement among physicians, supported by nonbinding guidelines, and that a difference of medical opinion cannot make a certification false; it added that NCCN guidelines and academic studies do not establish the standard of care. Pomona Valley at *13. The court held, applying Winter, that a medical-necessity certification can be false for the same reasons any opinion can be. Winter held that the FCA does not distinguish between “objective” and “subjective” falsity, and that an opinion is false if it is not honestly held or if it implies facts that do not exist. Winter at 1117, 1119. The court found that the complaint alleged more than a difference of opinion: a revenue-based compensation structure supplying a motive, repeated and routine certifications that contradicted patient-specific facts and the guidelines, and patient-by-patient detail, the same combination Winter found sufficient. Pomona Valley at *12–13.
  • The physicians’ patient-specific defenses raised fact disputes. The physicians also argued case by case, for example that hospice status does not establish that radiation was unnecessary and that one patient’s treatment reflected reasonable clinical disagreement. The court treated those as fact disputes and declined to resolve them on a motion to dismiss. Id. at *13.

2. Pomona Valley: what the hospital knew

  • The relator plausibly alleged that the hospital acted with at least reckless disregard. The physicians did not contest scienter as to themselves. Id. at *14. The hospital argued that the presence of its administrators at meetings where physicians disagreed did not plead scienter, because non-physician administrators attended to ensure that hospital policies were followed, not to overrule treating physicians. Id. at *15. The court held that Dr. Latif plausibly alleged at least reckless disregard. The theory, it explained, was not that administrators should have overruled the physicians, but that the hospital kept submitting claims in reckless disregard of whether the certifications were true. Relying on the “ostrich” rule of United States v. Bourseau, 531 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008), the court found sufficient allegations that the hospital incentivized the treatment, heard repeated objections from other oncologists, received written patient complaints, and continued to submit CMS-1500 forms without further inquiry. Under Rule 9(b), scienter may be alleged generally. Pomona Valley at *14–15.

3. Pomona Valley: materiality and presentment

  • Medical necessity is a material condition of payment. The physicians argued that no payor was alleged to have denied a claim, conducted an audit, or recouped a payment. The court held that, under Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176 (2016) (Escobar), proof of materiality “can include, but is not necessarily limited to” such evidence, and that medical necessity is an express condition of Medicare and Medi-Cal payment, not a minor or insubstantial one. Pomona Valley at *15–16.
  • The physicians caused the claims to be presented. The physicians also argued that they never submitted a claim themselves. The court held that the FCA reaches anyone who “causes” a false claim to be presented, and that the physicians’ certifications caused the hospital to submit the claims. Id. at *16–17.

4. Pomona Valley: the reverse false claim and the insurance-fraud claim

  • The reverse false claims count merely repackaged the presentment claims. The hospital argued that the reverse false claims count merely repackaged the presentment claims. Dr. Latif answered that the count pleaded an alternative theory: that the hospital learned of the fraud only after submitting the claims and then failed to return the money within 60 days. The court agreed with the hospital. It held that a reverse false claim requires an “obligation to pay” independent of the hospital’s lack of entitlement to the payments in the first place, and it found no facts alleged about the hospital learning of the fraud after submission. It dismissed the count with one more opportunity to amend. Id. at *17–18.
  • The Insurance Fraud Prevention Act claim alleged no harm to an insurer. The physicians argued that the claim alleged fraud on the State, not on an insurer. The court agreed, holding that insurers, not the government, are the direct victims the statute protects, and that the complaint named only one private insurer and alleged no facts showing it was harmed. That claim was also dismissed with leave to amend. The California False Claims Act claim survived for the same reasons as the federal claims. Id. at *18–19.

5. Sheldon: whether the meaning of Best Price should go to the Fourth Circuit now

  • Allergan asked the Fourth Circuit to decide now whether the Rebate Statute requires aggregation. Allergan framed its first question as whether the Rebate Statute requires a manufacturer to aggregate discounts given to different entities. It argued that this is a pure, controlling question of law; that judges had disagreed on it, citing the panel majority in the 2022 appeal, Judge Wynn’s dissent there, and Judge Keenan’s dissent in Sheldon VII, where she would have read Best Price as the single lowest price to a single purchaser; and that a favorable answer would end the case. Sheldon at *12–14. Sheldon responded that it would be “peculiar” to send the question back months after the Fourth Circuit sent it down, and that further delay would harm a case already in discovery. Id. at *14.
  • The meaning of the statute was not a controlling question fairly included in the order. The court held that the question did not meet that requirement of §1292(b). The order did not decide what the statute means; it deferred that ruling, so the real question on appeal would be whether deferral was error. The Fourth Circuit had chosen to leave the issue to the district court “in the first instance” and set no timetable, let alone required a ruling before discovery. And the question, in what the court called a largely untested context, was “heavily freighted with the necessity for factual assessment”: a record showing how stacked rebates actually work could inform the statutory analysis, and the materials the court had judicially noticed on the second motion to dismiss would ordinarily convert such a motion into one for summary judgment. Id. at *14–15.
  • The other §1292(b) requirements were met only in part, and the case’s history weighed against certification. The court found the remaining requirements met only in part. It agreed that there was substantial ground for difference of opinion, given the question’s novelty and the disagreement among Fourth Circuit judges, and that an interlocutory ruling would materially advance the litigation, but only if it favored Allergan. Weighing a case filed in 2014, two rounds of motions to dismiss, and multiple appeals, it declined to certify. Id. at *17–18.

6. Sheldon: whether the court must decide the statute’s meaning before discovery

  • Allergan also asked whether the court must decide the statute’s meaning before discovery. Allergan’s second question asked whether, in an FCA case turning on a statute’s objective meaning, the court must decide that meaning as a matter of law before discovery. Allergan relied on Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) (Loper Bright), arguing that statutes have a single best meaning discernible with the traditional tools of construction, as courts decide in Administrative Procedure Act cases without discovery. Sheldon answered that the timing of motion practice is a matter of discretion, not law. Sheldon at *18–19.
  • The timing question resembled a request for mandamus, not a controlling question of law. The court held that the question resembled a request for mandamus and was not a controlling question of law. In the court’s words, Loper Bright “explains how a federal court should interpret statutes, not when they should do so.” District courts routinely resolve purely legal questions at summary judgment, and Allergan cited no authority limiting that discretion and identified no conflicting authority. Allergan will be able to raise its statutory interpretation arguments at summary judgment. Id. at *2, *19–21.

7. Tsahas: whether the complaints were protected activity

  • A 340B violation is not exempt from the FCA because the 340B statute has its own remedies. The defendants argued that Tsahas raised only generic concerns about regulatory noncompliance, not fraud on the government. Tsahas at *9. The court found Adventist persuasive on the point that a 340B violation is not exempt from the FCA merely because the 340B statute has an administrative enforcement mechanism. Whether diversion itself can ground an FCA claim, the court said, likely turns on whether the conduct caused materially false claims to the government, a question neither party briefed and the court declined to resolve. Id. at *9–10.
  • A jury could find that Tsahas reasonably believed the hospital was defrauding the government. The court held that a jury could find her complaints protected. An employee need not prove an actual FCA violation; under United States ex rel. Sibley v. University of Chicago Medical Center, 44 F.4th 646 (7th Cir. 2022), she must genuinely and reasonably believe the employer is committing fraud on the government. The defendants’ cases involved concerns far removed from claims for payment, and no “magic words” are required. Lewis v. AbbVie, Inc., 152 F.4th 807, 814 (7th Cir. 2025) (Lewis). Viewing the evidence in her favor, the court found that she complained that the hospital was trying to qualify patients who did not qualify, allowing it to buy drugs at discounted prices and presumably seek reimbursement from government programs. Tsahas at *10–11.
  • The court rejected both sides’ remaining arguments on protected activity. The defendants also argued that Tsahas did not use compliance or legal channels. The court rejected the argument, pointing to evidence that she wrote to the hospital’s lawyer after her October 16 meeting with the CEO (he replied a week later), had been involved since July with outside counsel’s memorandum questioning the arrangement, and raised her concerns with the CFO and human resources. Id. at *11. Tsahas, for her part, argued that defense counsel’s remark at a discovery hearing, that she “was trying to do the right thing,” judicially estopped the defendants from contesting her good faith. The court rejected that argument as well. Id. at *12.

8. Tsahas: notice and causation

  • The record created a fact dispute about whether the hospital knew of her concerns. The defendants argued that Tsahas never told them she suspected fraud. The court held that the notice requirement is “not particularly onerous, but it is essential,” Lewis at 814, and that the record created a fact dispute, pointing in particular to her written ethics complaint two days before she was suspended. Tsahas at *13–14.
  • The court applied the Seventh Circuit’s “at least partially” causation standard. The defendants urged a but-for causation standard, citing DiFiore v. CSL Behring, LLC, 879 F.3d 71 (3d Cir. 2018), and United States ex rel. King v. Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 871 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 2017). The court held that it remains bound by the Seventh Circuit’s “at least partially” standard in Fanslow v. Chicago Manufacturing Center, Inc., 384 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2004) (Fanslow), and that the difference was academic here because her evidence would reach a jury under either standard. Tsahas at *14.

9. Tsahas: pretext

  • A jury must decide whether the hospital’s stated reasons were pretext. The hospital offered testimony that Tsahas admitted to the unauthorized lookback change and was evasive, which the court said could be a legitimate basis for discipline if honestly believed. The court held, however, that a jury must decide whether those reasons were pretext. It found the timing “especially significant”: the only material event between the October 25 ceremony, when her supervisor testified she did not know Tsahas’s job was in jeopardy, and the October 28 suspension notice was the ethics complaint. The court also pointed to the CEO’s dinner remark asking whether she was “worried about what pharmacist I’m going to fire next,” inconsistencies over who decided to suspend and fire her, the investigator’s acknowledged unfamiliarity with the 340B Program, the absence of any verification of the lookback change, a later audit suggesting over-qualification rather than under-qualification, and her 20-year record. Id. at *15–16.

10. Tsahas: defamation

  • The defamation claim also survived. The defendants challenged the defamation claim on several grounds, and the court rejected each. It held that a statement can be defamatory even if the listener does not believe it, that the alleged statements were factual and potentially defamatory per se, that hearsay objections should be left for motions in limine, and that the defendants’ arguments about the HRSA self-report were too perfunctory to resolve the claim. It will require Tsahas to identify the specific statements before trial. Id. at *16–18.

Holding

  • Pomona Valley. The motions to dismiss were granted in part and denied in part. The federal presentment and false-statement claims and the California False Claims Act claim proceed against the hospital and both physicians; the reverse false claims count against the hospital and the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act claim were dismissed with leave to amend, with any amended complaint due November 23, 2026. Pomona Valley at *19.
  • Sheldon. Allergan’s motion to certify the June 29, 2026 order for interlocutory appeal under §1292(b) was denied as to both proposed questions; the case remains in discovery. Sheldon at *21.
  • Tsahas. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied in its entirety; the §3730(h) retaliation claim and the defamation claim proceed to trial. Tsahas at *18–19.

What to Watch

  • Whether the Sheldon court reads the Rebate Statute to require aggregation. The question the Fourth Circuit left open now comes up at summary judgment, after discovery into how stacked rebates actually work. Whatever the court decides, the answer becomes the reference point for Best Price reporting across the industry.
  • Whether diversion can ground an FCA claim. Tsahas expressly leaves open whether 340B diversion causes false claims to the government. After Adventist, that question is likely to be briefed squarely in a case where it is dispositive rather than, as here, one step removed in a retaliation claim.
  • The Pomona Valley amended complaint, due November 23, 2026. It will show whether the relator can plead a reverse false claims theory, based on the 60-day overpayment rule, that stands apart from the presentment claims.
  • The Seventh Circuit’s causation standard for §3730(h). The circuit has signaled that it might revisit Fanslow in light of the Title VII but-for standard, and Tsahas preserves the issue.

What This Means for Resolving FCA Disputes

Each of these rulings postpones a legal off-ramp that the defense sought early, and that changes how the cases are valued. In a clinical-judgment case like Pomona Valley, falsity becomes an expert-driven, patient-by-patient inquiry, and the hospital’s exposure turns on what its administrators heard and did. Claim sampling and an agreed view of the record become the practical tools for narrowing the range.

In Sheldon, the controlling legal question remains open, so the parties lack a shared reference point. Discovery costs mount while the answer that would most move the numbers waits for summary judgment.

Retaliation claims like Tsahas are different. They are individual, fact-driven, and headed to a jury on a contest of credibility, with §3730(h) remedies that include reinstatement, two times back pay, special damages, and attorney’s fees. That is the kind of dispute in which both sides’ risk is easiest to price, and a negotiated resolution is often within reach.

John Libby is an arbitrator, mediator, and settlement counsel with LibbyADR LLC. This post contains his own summaries of the decisions discussed, prepared for general informational purposes only. The summaries are not intended to be a complete statement of any court’s reasoning, nor should they be taken to indicate how he would rule as an arbitrator in any particular case. In addition, the summaries are not legal advice, nor should they be construed as legal advice. Readers should not act on these posts, but should review the decisions themselves and consult with legal counsel.

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FCA Case Spotlight: A District Court Rejects the Article II Challenge to Qui Tam, Then Certifies the Question for the Second Circuit and Stays the Case https://libbyadr.com/fca-case-spotlight-barnes-v-healthnow-qui-tam-constitutionality/ https://libbyadr.com/fca-case-spotlight-barnes-v-healthnow-qui-tam-constitutionality/#respond Wed, 18 Nov 2026 20:11:52 +0000 https://libbyadr.com/?p=1724 United States ex rel. Barnes v. HealthNow New York, Inc., No. 16-CV-88 (JLS) (HKS), 2026 WL 2666843 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2026) (adopting report and recommendation; certifying under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b))

Healthcare / False Claims Act — qui tam constitutionality (Appointments, Vesting, and Take Care Clauses)

Introduction and Executive Summary

The issue of the constitutionality of the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act (FCA) continues to percolate through the courts. The argument has a pedigree: in United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc., 599 U.S. 419 (2023), Justice Thomas dissenting, and Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett, concurring, agreed that there are “substantial arguments that the qui tam device is inconsistent with Article II” and said the Court should consider them in an appropriate case. Id. at 442 (Kavanaugh, J., joined by Barrett, J., concurring); id. at 449–52 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justices Kavanaugh and Thomas repeated the point in Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath, 604 U.S. 140, 167 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring). A Florida district court accepted the Appointments Clause version of the argument and dismissed a Medicare fraud case, but on September 1, 2026, the Eleventh Circuit vacated that ruling, holding that relators do not occupy a continuing position and so are not officers of the United States, and remanded the Vesting Clause and Take Care Clause arguments for decision. United States ex rel. Zafirov v. Florida Medical Associates, LLC, 190 F.4th 1298 (11th Cir. 2026) (Zafirov). On September 10, 2026, in United States ex rel. Barnes v. HealthNow New York, Inc. (Barnes), a qui tam pending since 2016 against a New York health insurer, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York considered all three constitutional arguments. The court denied the insurer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and made four rulings. First, it adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation that the Appointments Clause challenge fails, relying on the decisions of every court of appeals to have addressed it. Second, it held that the Vesting Clause and Take Care Clause arguments are foreclosed by the same authorities. Third, it denied the insurer leave to amend its answer to assert unconstitutionality as an affirmative defense, because the defense would be futile. Fourth, it certified its order for interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b), writing that the defendant and its amicus “raise strong arguments” under the Vesting and Take Care Clauses and “possibly” the Appointments Clause, and stayed all deadlines pending the Second Circuit’s decision on the application and any appeal.

Background Facts

The qui tam action

Madelyn Barnes brought the action under the federal FCA, 31 U.S.C. §3729 et seq., and the New York State False Claims Act, N.Y. State Fin. Law §187 et seq., on behalf of the United States and New York State. She alleged that HealthNow New York Inc., doing business under the Blue Cross/Blue Shield banner, improperly overpaid healthcare claims at the expense of the United States, New York State, and local governments by submitting false statements to them. Barnes at *3 (report and recommendation (R&R), appended to the decision as Exhibit A). The case was filed in 2016, and the court’s earlier decisions in it, which the court incorporated, set out the facts. Id.

The motion for judgment on the pleadings

On February 3, 2025, the next business day after the relator filed a motion on January 31, 2025 to resolve discovery disputes, HealthNow moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), arguing that the FCA’s qui tam provisions are unconstitutional, and for leave to amend its answer to plead that defense. It served the notice of constitutional challenge that Rule 5.1 requires. The United States intervened on April 7, 2025, solely to defend the constitutionality of the qui tam provisions, and opposed the motion. The magistrate judge recommended on May 9, 2025, that both requests be denied. HealthNow objected, and the court allowed the Chamber of Commerce of the United States to file an amicus brief. Barnes at *1, *3–4, *10 (R&R).

Mediation and the stay

In July 2025, the court held a status conference to discuss pending motions, outstanding discovery, a possible interlocutory appeal and an associated stay, and the usefulness of more mediation. The court then ordered mediation, and the parties held multiple sessions between September 2025 and August 2026. The case did not settle, and the court issued its decision on September 10, 2026. Barnes at *1.

Legal Analysis

1. Timeliness

  • The relator argued that the challenge came too late. She pointed out that Polansky issued in June 2023 and the Florida district court’s Zafirov decision in September 2024, that HealthNow acknowledged Zafirov in a November 8, 2024 filing, and that it filed the motion in February 2025, just after she moved to resolve discovery disputes. The magistrate judge found the timing “suspect,” noting that HealthNow had itself said that prolonging discovery rather than moving to dispositive motions was not in the interest of the court or the parties. The court nevertheless declined to deny the motion as untimely. Rule 12(c) permits a motion after the pleadings close as long as it does not delay trial; here, no trial date had been set, and the motion raised a purely legal question. Barnes at *5 (R&R).

2. The Appointments Clause

  • HealthNow argued that relators are officers who were never appointed. The Appointments Clause requires “Officers of the United States” to be appointed by the President, with Senate confirmation, or, for inferior officers, by the President, the courts, or department heads. HealthNow argued that the qui tam provisions give relators significant authority to enforce federal law with only limited supervision, and that relators hold continuing positions established by law. Barnes at *6 (R&R).
  • The court found the weight of authority against that argument. Every court of appeals to consider the question has rejected it: United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell International Corp., 282 F.3d 787, 805 (10th Cir. 2002); Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, 252 F.3d 749, 758 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc); United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud v. General Electric Co., 41 F.3d 1032, 1041 (6th Cir. 1994); and United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 759 (9th Cir. 1993). District courts have overwhelmingly done so as well, including in United States ex rel. Penelow v. Janssen Products, LP, 2025 WL 937504, at *12 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-1818 (3d Cir.). Since the R&R issued, the Eleventh Circuit has reached the same conclusion in Zafirov, which the district court noted when it adopted the R&R. Barnes at *6 (R&R); id. at *2 n.3.
  • Why the courts reasoned that a relator is not an officer. An officer’s tenure, duration, emolument, and duties must be “continuing and permanent, not occasional or temporary.” United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511–12 (1879). A relator’s duties are temporary, and the position exists only for the duration of the lawsuit, while the government can intervene, monitor, and limit discovery, and settle without the relator’s consent. The Ninth Circuit added that a relator who litigates a single case does not have primary responsibility for enforcing the FCA and does not exercise authority so significant that only an officer may exercise it. Boeing, 9 F.3d at 759. The court noted that the Second Circuit has not addressed the Appointments Clause question but had rejected an Article III challenge to the qui tam provisions in United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Technologies Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1154–55 (2d Cir. 1993), observing that the statute gives the executive branch substantial control over the litigation. Barnes at *7 (R&R).
  • HealthNow relied on the separate writings in Polansky and on Zafirov. The court characterized the argument as resting on the “speculative, non-binding concurrences and dissent” in Polansky, in which three Justices expressed interest in a question that was not before the Court, and on the Florida district court’s decision in Zafirov, which the magistrate judge found “neither binding nor persuasive” and which other courts had criticized as an outlier. The district court’s order noted in a footnote that the Eleventh Circuit had since vacated that decision. The court also distinguished United States v. Donziger, 38 F.4th 290 (2d Cir. 2022), on which HealthNow relied, because it held that special prosecutors are officers who wield federal prosecutorial power in positions that may last for years, which the court said is not true of relators. Barnes at *7 n.4, *8 (R&R); id. at *2 n.3.

3. The Vesting and Take Care Clauses

  • HealthNow also argued that the qui tam provisions violate the Vesting Clause, which vests executive power in the President, and the Take Care Clause, which requires the President to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The magistrate judge held that these arguments are foreclosed by the authorities above, which hold that the qui tam mechanism, with or without government intervention, “was crafted with particular care to maintain the primacy of the Executive Branch in prosecuting false-claims actions.” Rockwell, 282 F.3d at 807. The R&R cited decisions from the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits rejecting Take Care Clause challenges. Barnes at *8–9 (R&R).

4. Leave to amend the answer

  • HealthNow asked to amend its answer to add unconstitutionality as an affirmative defense. Leave to amend may be denied for good reason, including futility. Because the constitutional defense failed for the reasons above, the magistrate judge held that the defense would be futile and recommended denial. Barnes at *9 (R&R).

5. Certification for interlocutory appeal and the stay

  • The court adopted the R&R but certified the question. After reviewing the recommendation de novo, the court denied the motion, and then, “[g]iven the state of decisional law on the separation-of-powers issue, the status of the issue under Second Circuit caselaw, and the age of various cited decisions that predate more modern pronouncements,” certified that its order “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. §1292(b); Barnes at *2.
  • What the court said about the merits of the opposing view. The court quoted the Polansky dissent and concurrence, along with concurring opinions from the Fifth Circuit in United States ex rel. Gentry v. Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of Pearland, L.L.C., 157 F.4th 758, 766–67 (5th Cir. 2025) (Ho, J., concurring), and United States ex rel. Montcrief v. Peripheral Vascular Associates, P.A., 133 F.4th 395, 412 (5th Cir. 2025) (Duncan, J., concurring), each questioning whether private relators may wield the government’s power. It wrote that HealthNow and the Chamber “raise strong arguments that the FCA’s qui tam device indeed violates the Constitution’s Vesting Clause and Take-Care Clause, as well as—possibly—the Appointments Clause,” and that the Second Circuit’s attention “would resolve the issue for numerous cases within the Circuit.” Id. at *2–3.
  • The stay. The court stayed all dates and deadlines pending HealthNow’s application for appeal, the Second Circuit’s resolution of it, and, if permitted, the appeal, with status reports due at the end of each event. Id. at *3.

Holding

The court denied HealthNow’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and for leave to amend its answer, holding on the magistrate judge’s reasoning that the FCA’s qui tam provisions do not violate the Appointments, Vesting, or Take Care Clauses, and that the unconstitutionality defense would be futile. It certified the order under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) and stayed the case. Barnes at *2–3.

What to Watch

The district court’s certification is only the first step. Under §1292(b), HealthNow then had to petition the Second Circuit for permission to appeal, and the court of appeals may accept or decline the appeal in its discretion. HealthNow filed its petition on September 18, 2026, as No. 26-2620, and on September 23 the Chamber of Commerce moved for leave to file an amicus brief supporting it; the court referred that motion to the panel considering the petition. The public docket does not yet show a ruling on the petition. If the Second Circuit accepts the appeal, it would join the Eleventh Circuit, whose decision in Zafirov left the Take Care and Vesting Clause arguments open on remand, in addressing the modern Article II challenge. The Third Circuit’s decision in Penelow, No. 25-1818, argued March 18, 2026, and involving all three clauses on a full trial record, is still awaiting decision. A ruling from either court would change the calculus for the many qui tam defendants who have raised the argument. The question is also gaining attention in the Fifth Circuit: on November 13, 2026, in United States ex rel. Jackson v. United States, ___ F.4th ___, 2026 WL 3454267 (5th Cir. 2026), Judge Willett wrote a concurrence questioning the qui tam device under the Vesting and Take Care Clauses, and Chief Judge Elrod wrote that those concerns are “no doubt en banc worthy” and that it may be time to revisit Riley in a proper case. The Supreme Court remains the final audience, and the Polansky concurrences and dissent suggest that at least three Justices would like to see an appropriate vehicle.

What This Means for Resolving Qui Tam Cases With a Constitutional Defense

A pending constitutional challenge to the qui tam mechanism complicates, or at least delays, settlement efforts. The district court’s certification of the question to the Second Circuit shows that the argument, rejected by most courts to date, still has sufficient legs to justify further discussion, primarily due to the doubts about constitutionality expressed by three Supreme Court justices. Defendants who preserved the defense have a reason to value the chance of a ruling that ends the action, and a relator and the government have a reason to value certainty before that ruling comes. In Barnes, nearly a year of mediation sessions in a case filed in 2016 did not produce a settlement, and the stay now pauses all litigation dates and deadlines while the appellate process plays out. The order does not prevent the parties from continuing settlement discussions, but as a practical matter the timing of any resolution may track the Second Circuit’s decisions – whether to accept the appeal and, if so, how it decides. For parties in other qui tam cases, the practical questions are, once the defense is preserved, whether a stay serves them, and how each side prices an outcome driven by a circuit decision rather than the facts of the case.

John Libby is an arbitrator, mediator, and settlement counsel with LibbyADR LLC. This post contains his own summaries of the decisions discussed, prepared for general informational purposes only. The summaries are not intended to be a complete statement of any court’s reasoning, nor should they be taken to indicate how he would rule as an arbitrator in any particular case. In addition, the summaries are not legal advice, nor should they be construed as legal advice. Readers should not act on these posts, but should review the decisions themselves and consult with legal counsel.

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FCA Case Spotlight: Commissions Alone Do Not Show Intent to Induce, But What the Sales Representatives Do Can (Langer v. Zimmer Biomet) https://libbyadr.com/fca-case-spotlight-langer-v-zimmer-biomet-commission-pay/ https://libbyadr.com/fca-case-spotlight-langer-v-zimmer-biomet-commission-pay/#respond Wed, 18 Nov 2026 20:11:51 +0000 https://libbyadr.com/?p=1723 United States ex rel. Langer v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., No. 21-cv-11293-PBS, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2026 WL 3151432 (D. Mass. Oct. 21, 2026)

Healthcare / False Claims Act / Anti-Kickback Statute (commission pay for independent-contractor medical device sales representatives)

Introduction and Executive Summary

Is the payment of commissions to independent-contractor sales representatives a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS)? The statute’s safe harbor protects payments by an employer to a bona fide employee, 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b(b)(3)(B), but it does not reach independent contractors. Relators argue that a manufacturer’s percentage-of-sales commissions to 1099 representatives are therefore unlawful remuneration whenever the other elements are met, and manufacturers answer that wanting to sell more product is not the same as intending to induce referrals. As the district court read the cases, the Fourth Circuit has read the statute broadly on this point, United States ex rel. Nicholson v. MedCom Carolinas, Inc., 42 F.4th 185 (4th Cir. 2022). The Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits ask instead whether the payor meant to improperly influence the people making healthcare decisions, United States v. Cockerell, 140 F.4th 213 (5th Cir. 2025); United States v. Sorensen, 134 F.4th 493 (7th Cir. 2025); United States v. Schena, 142 F.4th 1217 (9th Cir. 2025) (interpreting parallel language in the Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1824 (2026). The First Circuit has not reached the issue yet, but the question might reach there soon. On October 21, 2026, in United States ex rel. Langer v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2026 WL 3151432 (D. Mass. Oct. 21, 2026) (Langer), the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts took up the question on summary judgment in a qui tam brought by a former sales representative, Todd Langer, over an orthopedic device company’s commissioned contractor sales force. It granted the motion in part and denied it in part, making four rulings in the process. First, it adopted the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit approach and held that paying commissions to contractor representatives does not, by itself, show the intent to induce that the AKS requires. Second, using the “suspect characteristics” identified by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as guideposts, it held that a reasonable jury could find both an unlawful intent to induce and willfulness, so the AKS issue survived summary judgment. Third, on the False Claims Act (FCA) theories, it let the claim proceed under 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b(g), which treats claims “resulting from” an AKS violation as false, but granted summary judgment on the false certification theory for lack of evidence of any actual certification. Fourth, it held that the relator qualified as an original source and granted summary judgment on the state and local claims other than the Colorado claim.

Background Facts

The sales force transition

Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc. (Zimmer Biomet) designs, manufactures, and sells orthopedic products. It was formed in June 2015 when Zimmer Holdings, Inc. and Biomet, Inc. merged. Both predecessors had used a mix of W-2 employee and 1099 independent-contractor sales representatives in their “direct” territories, where a company employee manages the representatives. (In “indirect” territories, by contrast, an independent distributor markets the devices under a contract with the company. The relator’s claims concerned only direct territories.) Langer at *1-*2. As part of integrating the two sales forces, Zimmer Biomet moved its W-2 representatives in direct territories to 1099 status effective January 1, 2016, although whether a small percentage working on specialty product lines remained employees was disputed. It said it did so to save money, ensure consistency, and encourage entrepreneurship, with an internal presentation describing the “primary purpose” as reinvigorating the “independence and entrepreneurial spirit” of the sales force. The company also hoped the change would increase revenue. Since then, it has converted some direct territories back to W-2 employees. Id. at *2.

What the representatives did and how they were paid

All of the representatives, employees and contractors alike, sought to generate business. They developed relationships with assigned facilities and surgeons, contacted surgeons who had not used Zimmer Biomet products recently, and sometimes pitched more expensive “top-of-the-line” products. They sometimes took surgeons to meals or brought food to their offices, and Zimmer Biomet paid reasonable travel expenses for surgeons to attend trainings and workshops where representatives were present. The relator flew with surgeons on a company-owned or chartered private plane both before and after the merger. The representatives also helped surgeons prepare for procedures, ordered devices, helped set up for surgery, and observed procedures to provide clinical support. They generally did not interact with patients during surgery, although the relator, who was a Zimmer Biomet sales representative in a direct territory, said he was occasionally introduced to a patient while setting up. Id. at *2.

In the direct territories, where Zimmer Biomet employees managed the representatives, the representatives were paid commissions based on a percentage of their sales, and all had quotas. Fewer than one percent of the 1099 representatives had a guaranteed minimum for a year or two. Zimmer Biomet’s compliance manual applied to all representatives. It prohibited improper payments to and gifts for healthcare providers, and it authorized only modest, occasional meals tied to scientific or educational presentations. The company investigated and disciplined employees and contractors the same way. Id. at *3. There were differences. Only contractors signed written agreements, which allowed termination for missing sales goals; contractors could hire family members as approved “sub-reps”; and contractors did not report directly to Zimmer Biomet supervisors. Whether employees and contractors received the same training was disputed. Id.

What Zimmer Biomet knew

The parties offered competing evidence about what Zimmer Biomet understood about the legality of the arrangement. The relator pointed to a 1997 suit in which Zimmer sued a contractor distributor, Nu Tech Medical, Inc., arguing that its volume-based payments to Nu Tech violated the AKS. Zimmer, Inc. v. Nu Tech Medical, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 850, 851–54 (N.D. Ind. 1999). In Advisory Opinion No. 98-1, requested after the suit was filed, OIG said that “[p]ercentage compensation arrangements are potentially abusive,” and it found Zimmer’s arrangement with Nu Tech “problematic.” The Indiana district court later held the contract violated the AKS. Id. at 863–64. Langer at *3. The relator also pointed to a 2018 putative class action, Karl v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., No. 18-cv-04176 (N.D. Cal.), in which a Zimmer Biomet sales representative alleged that the company had misclassified its representatives as independent contractors rather than employees under federal and California employment law. In opposing summary judgment in that case, the plaintiff argued that if the representatives were contractors, their commissions were illegal kickbacks. Zimmer Biomet answered that using commissioned contractor representatives is not a per se AKS violation, and the court did not reach the AKS point. As part of the settlement of Karl, Zimmer Biomet converted the representatives in its California direct territories to W-2 employees; its direct territories in other states continued to use contractors. Id. at *4.

Zimmer Biomet, for its part, emphasized that both predecessors entered corporate integrity agreements and deferred prosecution agreements in 2007 after a federal investigation of consulting arrangements between implant manufacturers and orthopedic surgeons. Those agreements, and the related reports and monitor reviews from 2007 to 2009, referred to the companies’ use of independent distributors. Biomet told federal authorities in 2008 that it used contractor representatives, and no one in the government or among the monitors raised a concern. Zimmer Biomet also disclosed its use of contractor representatives in Securities and Exchange Commission filings from 2018 to 2021. Id. at *4.

The relator

The relator had worked in medical device sales for many years. In 2006 he became a W-2 employee of Zimmer Rocky Mountain, an independent distributor that sold Zimmer products as an independent contractor. When Zimmer ended that contract in March 2014, he became a W-2 employee of Zimmer itself, with no change in title, supervision, training, or corporate policies. When Zimmer Biomet asked its direct-territory employees to sign independent contractor agreements, he declined, and on November 24, 2015 he was told his employment would end that December. In the meantime he raised AKS concerns with a sales executive and in emails to his supervisor, citing OIG Advisory Opinion 98-10. His supervisor forwarded the emails to an associate general counsel, who replied that there should be no concern because the representatives were prohibited from entering business relationships with physicians or hospitals or exerting undue influence over purchasing decisions. He raised the concern twice more in early 2016, in a severance letter and in a compliance office complaint, and his work ended in March 2016. Id. at *4-*5.

Procedure

The relator filed this qui tam in August 2021, and neither the United States nor any state intervened. The court denied Zimmer Biomet’s motion to dismiss, holding that the relator plausibly alleged remuneration paid with intent to induce referrals and that Zimmer Biomet acted knowingly and willfully, and that he was an original source despite the public disclosure bar. United States ex rel. Langer v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 3d 282 (D. Mass. 2024). After discovery, Zimmer Biomet moved for summary judgment on the AKS and FCA elements. The United States, which had declined to intervene, took part in the oral argument, and the Advanced Medical Technology Association (AdvaMed) appeared as amicus curiae. Langer at *5, *9.

Legal Analysis

1. The allegations: two FCA violations based on the AKS

The relator’s FCA theory, under both 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1)(A) (presenting a false claim) and §3729(a)(1)(B) (making a false record or statement material to a false claim), depended on the alleged AKS violation. The AKS makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully pay remuneration to induce a person to refer patients or to purchase, order, or recommend any item payable by a federal healthcare program. 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b(b)(2). An AKS violation can lead to FCA liability in two ways. Under the first, 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b(g) makes a claim that includes items “resulting from” an AKS violation false, and the plaintiff must show that the kickback was the but-for cause of a submitted claim. Under the second, false certification, the claim is false because someone misrepresented compliance with a material requirement that there be no AKS violation, and but-for causation is not required. Langer at *7 (citing United States ex rel. Flanagan v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc., 142 F.4th 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2025), and United States v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 128 F.4th 324, 333-34 (1st Cir. 2025)).

2. The AKS: what “intent to induce” means for commissioned contractor representatives

  • The issue arose because the safe harbor does not cover contractors, and Zimmer Biomet argued that wanting more sales is not an intent to induce. Zimmer Biomet moved for summary judgment on the ground that no reasonable jury could find it paid its contractor representatives with the intent to induce referrals that the AKS requires. It said it transitioned to using outside contractors to save costs, encourage entrepreneurship, and ensure consistency, and that a desire to increase sales or revenue does not satisfy the statute. The court noted at the outset that the employee safe harbor does not protect payments to independent contractors, Langer at *8 (citing United States v. Mallory, 988 F.3d 730, 738 (4th Cir. 2021)), and that OIG has said that any compensation arrangement between a seller and an independent sales agent for selling federally reimbursable items “potentially implicates” the AKS. Id. (quoting OIG Advisory Opinion No. 98-10).
  • The relator and the United States urged the Fourth Circuit’s broad reading. The district court read the Fourth Circuit’s decisions as treating commissions based on the volume or value of sales, paid to independent contractors hired to influence healthcare decision-makers, as unlawful remuneration. Id. at *9 (citing Nicholson, 42 F.4th at 194, and Mallory, 988 F.3d at 738). The relator and the government, which declined to intervene but participated at oral argument, essentially urged the court to follow that approach. They disclaimed a per se rule but argued that commission payments violate the AKS whenever remuneration, intent to induce, and willfulness are present, and that the payor intends to induce whenever it pays with the aim of influencing which products the representatives promote. The court observed that under that reading the intent element would be met in every commission case, because promoting the company’s products is always why the representatives were hired. Id. at *9.
  • The court rejected that reading and adopted the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit approach. It agreed with Zimmer Biomet that the AKS requires an intent to improperly influence provider decisions, and it adopted the approach of the circuits that distinguish between an intent to induce referrals, which is unlawful, and an intent to compensate marketers, which is not. Under that approach, a commission structure does not violate the AKS “without more.” Liability attaches when payments reflect “a wrongful effort to unduly influence the decisions of doctors and medical professionals making referrals.” Id. at *9 (quoting Schena, 142 F.4th at 1225). Those courts have found undue influence where a marketer effectively takes over the physician’s role in choosing a provider or product, where marketers are directed to mislead referral sources, and where marketers supply things like pre-written prescription pads, promotional dinners, and lavish vacations. Id. (citing Cockerell, Sorensen, and Schena).
  • Why: The First Circuit has not addressed the question, but the district court found the approach consistent with the First Circuit’s statement that the “heartland” of the AKS is the use of payments to improperly influence healthcare decisions, Guilfoile v. Shields, 913 F.3d 178, 192-93 (1st Cir. 2019), and with an earlier decision in the district defining intent to induce as an intent to “gain influence over the reason or judgment” of physicians. The court also found textual support. Quoting Schena, it said “induce” carries a specialized criminal-law meaning that “connotes not mere causation, but wrongful causation,” so commissions induce referrals in the colloquial sense but reflect the statutory meaning only when accompanied by a fraudulent intent or an effort to improperly influence physicians. The court added that it was “hard-pressed to read [the AKS] to criminalize (with major federal penalties) a standard payment structure for marketing personnel, even when the marketing personnel are persuasive in driving business.” Id. at *10 (quoting Schena, 142 F.4th at 1225).
  • Applying that standard, the court found disputed facts for a jury to decide. The court held that some of the relator’s evidence, including the quotas, termination for missed sales goals, and the move to contractors partly to improve sales performance, did not suffice by itself, because those practices “merely evince a lawful intent to compensate sales representatives for marketing services that drive sales.” Id. at *10. But the court found other facts that supported a reasonable inference of intent to improperly influence physicians, and it organized them around the factors OIG identified in Advisory Opinion No. 98-10, a separate 1998 opinion on sales-agent compensation, and in its 2003 compliance program guidance. It treated those factors as guideposts rather than binding authority, citing Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 406 (2024), and 42 C.F.R. §1008.53. Id. at *11. A jury could find that the representatives were paid almost entirely by commission and dealt directly with the surgeons who ordered the products. It was undisputed that representatives were present with surgeons in the operating room, which the court described as a position of exceptional influence. There was evidence of occasional contact with patients, of efforts to “upsell” top-of-the-line products because they cost more, of private-jet flights with surgeons and paid travel to workshops, and of meals and dinners with surgeons and company leadership. From the collective weight of those facts, a reasonable jury could infer an unlawful intent to induce rather than a desire simply to drive sales. Id. at *11.

3. The AKS: willfulness

  • The AKS requires knowing and willful conduct, and Zimmer Biomet argued the record could not support it. It pointed to its open use of contractor representatives, including in SEC filings, to the government’s awareness from its investigations in the 2000s, to the government’s failure to object, and to OIG advisory opinions approving similar arrangements. “Willfully” means knowledge that the conduct was unlawful, Langer at *12 (citing United States ex rel. Hart v. McKesson Corp., 96 F.4th 145, 157 (2d Cir. 2024)).
  • The court agreed that Zimmer Biomet’s open use of contractors and the government’s awareness cut against willfulness, but held that a jury could still find it. It cited the caution courts apply in granting summary judgment on scienter, which is often proved by inference. Zimmer, a predecessor, had argued in the Nu Tech litigation that volume-based payments to a contractor distributor violated the AKS, and OIG and the district court had agreed. The relator and, later, the plaintiff in the misclassification case had also warned the company that the arrangement might violate the AKS. The court said that whether the company believed the differences from Nu Tech made its post-merger payments permissible was a question for the jury, and that the “multiple warnings” together with Zimmer’s position in Nu Tech were enough for a reasonable jury to find willfulness. Id. at *12.
  • Why the government-knowledge evidence did not end the question. Government knowledge defeats scienter only with evidence of “explicit approval” or “cooperation and collaborative problem-solving,” not “merely showing some government knowledge.” The court found that Zimmer Biomet had not shown the government or the monitors knew about the particular features that raised questions about intent to influence physicians, and the earlier investigation concerned surgeon consulting arrangements, not contractor representatives. Id. at *13 (quoting United States ex rel. Streck v. Eli Lilly & Co., 152 F.4th 816, 845 (7th Cir. 2025), and United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS Caremark Corp., 875 F.3d 746, 757, 759 (3d Cir. 2017)). Nor did OIG’s advisory opinions settle it. OIG has approved arrangements with no more than two of its “suspect characteristics,” and the court said Zimmer Biomet’s arrangement arguably implicated at least four. Id.

4. The FCA allegations: what survived and what did not

  • Actual false claim and damages. Zimmer Biomet argued the relator had not identified a false claim tied to a commission. The relator compiled a list of orthopedic procedures using the company’s products in direct territories after the 2016 transition, excluding indirect territories and territories later converted to employees, and a consultant’s declaration matched one CMS-paid hip replacement to the company’s sales records. The court held that was enough at this stage, because a jury could infer from the per-sale commission structure that a commission was paid and from the exclusions that the representative was a contractor. It also rejected the argument that the relator had to disclose a damages computation earlier, because he had received claims data only after discovery closed. Id. at *14-*15.
  • But-for causation under §1320a-7b(g). Zimmer Biomet relied on the same court’s earlier decision in Omni Healthcare, Inc. v. MD Spine Solutions LLC, 761 F. Supp. 3d 356 (D. Mass. 2025), aff’d, 160 F.4th 248 (1st Cir. 2025), where no reasonable jury could find but-for causation because the relator offered no evidence that contractor status unduly influenced any provider and the laboratory had treated employees and contractors identically. Zimmer Biomet did not dispute that a reasonable jury could find the commissions, and the marketing and clinical services that came with them, were a but-for cause of claims in the sense that surgeons would not otherwise have bought its products; it relied instead on Omni Healthcare. The court did not decide whether Zimmer Biomet’s employees and contractors were treated differently. It distinguished Omni Healthcare because the relator here offered evidence of conduct that improperly or unduly influenced purchasing decisions, and that evidence, together with the common-sense inference that surgeons would not buy the products without the representatives’ marketing and clinical services, supported a triable case that the commissions were the but-for cause of the claims. Id. at *15.
  • False certification. The relator argued a jury could infer that providers certified AKS compliance, because the back of the CMS Form 1500 contains such a certification. The court held that the form language alone did not establish what any provider actually certified. In Flanagan, the First Circuit held a complaint insufficient where it alleged only that certifications were required and submitted, without allegations about what was actually submitted, and the court reasoned that this applies a fortiori on summary judgment. Without competent evidence of what any provider actually certified in connection with a claim for a Zimmer Biomet product, the theory failed. Id. at *16.
  • FCA scienter. The scienter argument tracked the willfulness argument and failed for the same reasons. The court was also unpersuaded that the ubiquity of commissioned contractor representatives in the device industry, or Zimmer Biomet’s compliance program and oversight, defeated scienter as a matter of law. Both are relevant to whether the company acted knowingly, the court said, but neither is dispositive. Id. at *17.
  • Original source. Zimmer Biomet renewed its public disclosure bar argument, saying the relator’s prefiling disclosure to the government lacked some details on which he now relied, such as the surgeon relationships and the sales growth quota. The court had already held the bar was triggered but that the relator was an original source. It held again that he was, because Zimmer Biomet cited no authority requiring a prefiling disclosure to contain every detail later relied on, and the disclosure included his internal complaint, the commission structure, and his own commissions, which bear on intent and state of mind. Id. at *17-*18.

5. The state-law claims

Zimmer Biomet moved for summary judgment on the relator’s claims under twenty-eight state and local false claims statutes. The relator abandoned sixteen of them, and he had received no claims data from ten of the remaining twelve state governments, which the court held fatal because an actual claim for payment is required; it rejected extrapolation from other states’ data without a statistical methodology. The Texas claim failed because it was pleaded in terms of false claims, and the Illinois claim failed for lack of evidence of a specific claim. The Colorado claim survived because the relator matched a Colorado Medicaid knee-replacement claim to Zimmer Biomet’s sales records, and Zimmer Biomet identified no difference from federal law. Id. at *18.

Holding

The court ALLOWED Zimmer Biomet’s motion for summary judgment as to (1) the substantive FCA claims (Counts One and Two) to the extent they rested on a false certification theory, (2) the FCA conspiracy claim (Count Three), which the relator had abandoned, and (3) the state and local claims other than the Colorado claim (Counts Four and Six through Thirty-One). It DENIED the motion as to (1) the substantive FCA claims to the extent they rested on the §1320a-7b(g) theory and (2) the Colorado claim (Count Five). Langer at *19 & n.1.

What to Watch

  • The First Circuit. The First Circuit has not addressed how the AKS applies to commission-based payments to independent-contractor sales representatives. Whether this case produces an appellate ruling depends on whether it is tried or resolved first.
  • Whether other courts follow the intent-to-influence approach. As the district court read them, the Fourth Circuit’s decisions and those of the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits take different approaches, and the Ninth Circuit’s Schena decision, which interpreted the parallel Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act language, drew a denial of certiorari in 2026.
  • The Colorado claim and the remaining federal theory. After this ruling, the case proceeds on the §1320a-7b(g) claim and a single state claim, under Colorado law. How much the relator can prove about specific claims and commissions will drive the damages picture.

What This Means for Resolving These Cases

The ruling narrows the scope of disputes relating to the legality of commission payments to independent contractors, but leaves room for factual disputes in settlement discussions and mediations. Under Langer and the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit decisions it follows, a defendant cannot be held to have violated the AKS merely because it pays commissions to contractor representatives, and a relator cannot get to a jury on the pay structure alone. The dispute remains as to what the representatives actually do: whether they are in the operating room, what they provide to surgeons, and whether they push higher-priced products. Those facts, and what the company was told about them, determine intent and willfulness. For a defendant, the risk is concentrated in conduct evidence and in prior internal and external warnings that are hard to explain away on summary judgment. For a relator, the pleading and proof burden is heavier than a per se theory would have been, and the claims-level evidence (an actual claim, an actual certification, state-by-state data) has to be in hand by summary judgment. Both sides now have a clearer map of what a trial would turn on, which is usually where a negotiation can start.

John Libby is an arbitrator, mediator, and settlement counsel with LibbyADR LLC. This post contains his own summaries of the decisions discussed, prepared for general informational purposes only. The summaries are not intended to be a complete statement of any court’s reasoning, nor should they be taken to indicate how he would rule as an arbitrator in any particular case. In addition, the summaries are not legal advice, nor should they be construed as legal advice. Readers should not act on these posts, but should review the decisions themselves and consult with legal counsel.

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Mediation Case Spotlight: What Survives the Mediation Session — The Pre-Suit Mediation Clause, the End-of-Day Email and the Expert Report https://libbyadr.com/williams-weissman-fazel-mediation/ https://libbyadr.com/williams-weissman-fazel-mediation/#respond Wed, 28 Oct 2026 22:37:03 +0000 https://libbyadr.com/?p=1719 Williams v. Rent 2 Own Trailers, L.L.C., No. 25-20352, 2026 WL 1759286 (5th Cir. June 18, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished) | Weissman v. Cheokas, No. 23-12527, 2026 WL 1759431 (11th Cir. June 18, 2026) (not reported in Fed. Rptr.) | Fazel v. Pete Fowler Construction Services, Inc., ___ Cal. Rptr. 3d ___, 2026 WL 1803124 (Cal. Ct. App. June 23, 2026)

Mediation · Confidentiality · Enforcement of Mediated Settlements · Pre-Suit Mediation Clauses · Litigation Privilege

Introduction and Executive Summary

Mediation runs on two promises. What’s said in the room stays there, and what’s agreed at the end of the day ends the dispute. Both get tested after the deal, when one side wants out or wants more, and in June 2026, three courts tested them from different directions. On June 18, 2026, in Williams v. Rent 2 Own Trailers, L.L.C. (Williams), the Fifth Circuit vacated a dismissal that had enforced a pre-suit mediation clause, holding that the party invoking the clause had waived it. The same day, the Eleventh Circuit held in Weissman v. Cheokas (Weissman) that a mediation agreement making “all communications of the parties in the mediation” confidential didn’t keep a court from reading the emails in which counsel settled the case at the close of the session, and it affirmed enforcement of that settlement. And on June 23, 2026, in Fazel v. Pete Fowler Construction Services, Inc. (Fazel), a California Court of Appeal held that the litigation privilege barred a homeowner who settled on the strength of her opponent’s expert report, prepared for mediation, from suing the expert when the repairs failed.

Background Facts

Williams: the clause no one invoked

Ahmad Williams leased two food-truck trailers from Rent 2 Own Trailers, L.L.C. (R2O) under leases requiring that disputes “be settled first by good faith mediation.” After he sent a demand letter, R2O repossessed the trailers rather than seek mediation. Williams at *1.

Williams’s June 15, 2023, demand letter followed R2O’s alleged failure to renew the trailers’ registration and tags. Williams, appearing pro se, sued in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in January 2024, and the case was transferred to the Southern District of Texas under the leases’ forum-selection clause. Once the case was in Texas, R2O moved to dismiss on a long list of grounds. Among 30 pages of argument was one about the leases’ mediation clause: without citing any authority, R2O argued that the clause made mediation a “condition precedent” to suit, so Williams’s case was premature. The district court didn’t explicitly adopt the condition-precedent theory. It instead “erroneously treated Defendants-Appellees’ mediation argument as unopposed and assumed, without analysis, the clause was specifically enforceable.” Williams at *1.

The district court dismissed without prejudice pending mediation. In an unpublished per curiam opinion on its summary calendar, the Fifth Circuit held that R2O had waived the obligation to mediate, vacated the judgment and remanded. Williams at *1–2.

Weissman: the emails at the close of the day

Mark Weissman and Michael Cheokas had litigated over a 2006 aircraft-asset foreclosure for years when they mediated in June 2023 under a Mediation Agreement that made mediation communications confidential but excepted “any written agreement made and executed by the parties as a result of the mediation.” Weissman at *1–2.

The June 12, 2023, mediation lasted nine hours. At the close of the session, Weissman’s counsel emailed proposed terms: dismissal of all claims, payment of $34,250 within ten business days, and mutual releases. Cheokas’s counsel replied with revisions: dismissal with prejudice, payment within fourteen business days, and carve-outs from the releases for sanctions and fee requests. Minutes later, Weissman’s counsel wrote back, “We agree to these changes.” The next morning, Weissman’s counsel told the district court that “as a result of the mediation,” the parties anticipated a dismissal with prejudice. Weissman at *2.

Within days, Weissman took the position that there had been no “meeting of the minds.” At an evidentiary hearing, his counsel argued that the Mediation Agreement barred the emails and any mediator testimony and that enforcement required a formally signed document. The mediator testified that “the matter was resolved in [his] opinion,” that the emails memorialized the terms, and that he typically requires “some kind of documentation” because parties often lack time to execute a formal written agreement. Weissman’s counsel didn’t cross-examine him or present evidence. Id. at *2–3.

The district court enforced the settlement and sanctioned Weissman’s counsel under 28 U.S.C. §1927. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in an opinion Westlaw lists as not reported in the Federal Reporter. Id. at *3, *8.

Fazel: the report behind the settlement

Maryam Fazel sued her neighbor over water intrusion from his property. The neighbor retained Pete Fowler Construction Services, which inspected both properties and wrote an expert report recommending repairs. Fazel acknowledged on appeal that the report “was prepared for mediation purposes.” She accepted the recommendations, the neighbor’s contractor did the work, and she settled for $8,250. When heavy rains came, her property flooded again, and she sued Fowler for negligence and, as a third-party beneficiary, for breach of contract. Fazel at *1, *3.

An anti-SLAPP motion disposed of four of her six counts against Fowler, but not the negligence and third-party-beneficiary counts, which the trial court found arose from conduct rather than statements. The Court of Appeal affirmed that ruling in an earlier appeal without deciding whether the litigation privilege barred those counts on the merits. On remand, the trial court held that it did and granted judgment on the pleadings for Fowler under the litigation privilege, California Civil Code §47(b). Id. at *1–2.

Legal Analysis

1. Williams: waiver of a pre-suit mediation clause

  • In Williams, the obligation to mediate ran both ways. The Fifth Circuit noted that it “has not addressed how a pre-dispute mediation clause should be interpreted or what remedies a court may properly impose for its purported breach,” and it didn’t decide those questions. It decided waiver. The clause called for mediation within 30 days’ notice of a dispute. R2O didn’t urge mediation in that window, repossessed instead, and raised the clause only after suit, “by characterizing the clause as a barrier to suit, not as a means to settle with Williams.” Williams at *2.
  • Litigation conduct compounded the waiver. R2O didn’t raise mediation during the year the case sat in Pennsylvania. Twenty days after moving to dismiss on the clause, it joined a case management plan reporting that the parties were “at wide odds” and that court mediation is often effective, and then didn’t ask for one. The court reasoned that the clause contemplated “an efficient and collaborative endeavor to resolve disputes,” and that R2O, having failed to pursue it, “should not now be heard to complain that Williams did the same.” Id.
  • Arbitration law didn’t fill the gap. R2O relied on cases applying the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The court called them inapposite, citing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Advanced Bodycare Solutions, LLC v. Thione International, Inc., 524 F.3d 1235, 1238–40 (11th Cir. 2008), which found mediation to fall outside the scope of the FAA. Williams at *2 n.5.

2. Weissman: the confidentiality clause and the settlement emails

  • In Weissman, the confidentiality clause meant what it said, including its exception. Applying Georgia’s plain-meaning rule, the Eleventh Circuit found the Mediation Agreement unambiguous. It separated “communications . . . in this mediation,” which were confidential, from “any written agreement made and executed . . . as a result of the mediation,” which could be used in any relevant proceeding. The emails fell in the second category. “The exchange was not a separate negotiation, but the written memorialization of the mediated settlement.” Weissman at *4.
  • An email exchange can be an agreement “made and executed.” Weissman argued that enforcement required a formally signed document. The court relied on Georgia authority treating attorney correspondence that memorializes agreed terms as sufficient, including Brumbelow v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 308 S.E.2d 544, 547 (Ga. 1983), and on the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding that emails with definite terms bearing counsel’s names can satisfy the statute of frauds, State v. Federal Defender Program, Inc., 882 S.E.2d 257, 272–75 (Ga. 2022). Because the emails “resulted from, and consummated, the mediation process,” they fell within the exception. Weissman at *4–5.
  • The mediator could say that the case settled. The court held that the mediator’s testimony fell within the disclosures the Georgia Uniform Mediation Act permits, O.C.G.A. §9-17-6(b)(1), which include whether a settlement was reached. His testimony “did not reveal any confidential bargaining positions” and addressed only whether an agreement was reached and completed, which the clause didn’t cover. Id. at *5.
  • Mutual assent was measured objectively, from the writing. The emails were “a textbook example of an offer, a counteroffer, and an unequivocal acceptance,” and the mediator’s testimony and Weissman’s own subsequent email to the court corroborated them. A later disagreement over the sanctions carve-out, which the counteroffer had addressed, didn’t undo assent to the essential terms. Id. at *6.
  • Contesting the deal had a cost, but only after the argument had been rejected. The district court didn’t treat counsel’s initial refusal to acknowledge the settlement as sanctionable. It sanctioned “repeated filings advancing the same position after rejection,” which the Eleventh Circuit agreed “went beyond reasonable advocacy and objectively impeded resolution.” Id. at *7–8.

3. Fazel: the litigation privilege and the opposing expert’s report

  • The case reached the court on the litigation-privilege argument, not on mediation confidentiality. On remand from the earlier anti-SLAPP appeal, Fowler moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the litigation privilege, California Civil Code §47(b), barred the remaining claims on the merits, and Fazel’s appeal challenged only that ruling. Fazel at *2. The two doctrines address different issues. The litigation privilege is an absolute immunity from derivative tort liability for communications made in judicial proceedings, meant to give litigants and witnesses “the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.” Id. (quoting Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 213 (1990)). California’s mediation-confidentiality statutes, Evidence Code §§1115–1128, govern what is said or written for a mediation by making it inadmissible and protected from disclosure; they don’t create an immunity from suit. The opinion doesn’t discuss mediation confidentiality at all. It mentions mediation only in noting Fazel’s acknowledgment that the report “was prepared for mediation purposes.” Id. at *3.
  • In Fazel, the expert’s work was protected because it only existed to be communicated during the mediation. The litigation privilege extends to noncommunicative acts “necessarily related to” a communication. Under Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1065 (2006), “unless it is demonstrated that an independent, noncommunicative, wrongful act was the gravamen of the action, the litigation privilege applies.” Fazel framed her claims around Fowler’s “formulation” of the repairs. The court answered that “[t]he whole point of formulating repairs was to include them in an expert report (a communication) prepared in the course of litigation,” and that the formulation couldn’t cause harm until the report reached her. Fazel at *3.
  • The court distinguished a case about physical conduct. Fazel relied on Mero v. Sadoff, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1466 (1995), where an employer’s examining physician allegedly aggravated a workers’ compensation claimant’s back injury. The court found Mero distinguishable: Fowler’s work was part of the testimonial process, and Fazel’s injury came from the report itself. Fazel at *3.
  • Fazel puts the time to test an opposing expert’s work before the settlement. The court noted that Fazel could have hired her own expert, negotiated additional repairs or kept litigating. “Fazel’s opportunity to challenge the recommendations in Fowler’s expert report was in the previous lawsuit, not in a derivative lawsuit.” Id. at *3. Fazel argued that a report prepared for her opponent shouldn’t have been used as a repair design at all. The court “flatly reject[ed] the notion that a retained expert has a duty to ensure that the opposing party does not rely on its expert report,” and described the case as “ultimately about Fazel’s decision, during the course of litigation, to rely on the opposing party’s expert report despite the obvious risk of bias.” Id. at *4.

Holding

Williams: Vacated and remanded in part, dismissed in part. R2O waived the leases’ pre-suit mediation obligation, so the dismissal pending mediation couldn’t stand. The court dismissed the appeal to the extent it challenged the Pennsylvania court’s transfer order, which only the Third Circuit could review. Williams at *1–2.

Weissman: Affirmed. The Mediation Agreement’s confidentiality provision didn’t bar the post-session settlement emails, which fell within its exception for written agreements made and executed as a result of the mediation, or the mediator’s testimony that a settlement was reached. The emails formed an enforceable settlement under Georgia law. The court also affirmed the §1927 sanctions against Weissman’s counsel and the denial of leave to amend. Weissman at *8.

Fazel: Affirmed. Because Fowler’s formulation of the repairs was an act necessarily related to a communicative act, its expert report, made in the course of a judicial proceeding, the absolute litigation privilege under California Civil Code §47(b), barred Fazel’s negligence and third-party-beneficiary claims. Fazel at *4.

What to Watch

  • Precedential weight. Williams states that it “is not designated for publication” under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, so it isn’t binding Fifth Circuit precedent. Weissman is a signed opinion issued after oral argument, but Westlaw lists it as not reported in the Federal Reporter. Fazel carries a Cal. Rptr. 3d placeholder on Westlaw.
  • The questions Williams left open. The Fifth Circuit still hasn’t said how a pre-dispute mediation clause is interpreted or what remedy fits its breach. A case in which the invoking party pressed for mediation promptly after notice would present those questions directly.
  • Mediation agreements drafted with Weissman in view. The outcome turned on the specific wording of the exception for written agreements “made and executed” as a result of the mediation, read under Georgia law. Agreements drafted differently, or governed by other law, may be read differently. The bottom line: check and cite your own jurisdiction’s law regarding mediation confidentiality, and if you want a higher degree of protection, be sure to specifically define it in the agreement.
  • What Fazel doesn’t address. The opinion rests entirely on the litigation privilege. It doesn’t discuss California’s mediation-confidentiality rules, and it doesn’t address the anti-SLAPP counts resolved in the earlier appeal or the claims against the contractor and the neighbor.

What This Means for Mediating Disputes

Each of these cases came down to something that was settled before anyone reached the courthouse: the 30 days after a demand letter, the words of a confidentiality clause, or the sequence of an email exchange. Williams is about the clause that sends parties to mediation in the first place. A pre-suit mediation provision is a commitment to try to resolve a dispute early, and a party that skips that step when the dispute arises may find that the clause no longer works as a bar to suit. In Weissman, the mediation agreement drew a line between what parties say in the session and what they sign or send as a result of it, and the court enforced that line as written. A short exchange of terms at the end of a long day, with an unequivocal acceptance, was enough to end years of litigation, and the mediator’s role afterward was limited to confirming that a deal had been reached. The narrower the gap between what the parties agreed in the room and what they put in writing before they left, the less there was for a court to resolve.

Fazel moves the risk of a failed fix to the front end. A settlement based on the other side’s expert work can efficiently close a property or construction dispute. But under the litigation privilege, the court tests that work in the original lawsuit, not afterward, and it pointed to the tools Fazel had before she settled: her own expert, negotiation over additional repairs, or continued litigation. In all three cases, the courts treated mediation as something parties do rather than something they hold in reserve and gave effect to what they did.

John Libby is an arbitrator, mediator, and settlement counsel with LibbyADR LLC. This post contains his own summaries of the decisions discussed, prepared for general informational purposes only. The summaries are not intended to be a complete statement of any court’s reasoning, nor should they be taken to indicate how he would rule as an arbitrator in any particular case. In addition, the summaries are not legal advice, nor should they be construed as legal advice. Readers should not act on these posts, but should review the decisions themselves and consult with legal counsel.

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FCA Case Spotlight: The Southern District of Ohio Holds That a Hospital–Neurosurgery Referral Exchange Is Not “Remuneration” https://libbyadr.com/shahbabian-v-trihealth-aks-remuneration/ https://libbyadr.com/shahbabian-v-trihealth-aks-remuneration/#respond Wed, 28 Oct 2026 21:28:47 +0000 https://libbyadr.com/?p=1717 United States ex rel. Shahbabian v. TriHealth, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-67, 2026 WL 3030389 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2026) | United States ex rel. Murphy v. TriHealth, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-168, 2025 WL 2104279 (S.D. Ohio July 28, 2025) | United States ex rel. Martin v. Hathaway, 63 F.4th 1043 (6th Cir. 2023)

Healthcare / False Claims Act · Anti-Kickback Statute (remuneration) · Stark Law (personal services exception) · First-to-File · Rule 9(b)

Introduction and Executive Summary

Co-management agreements between hospitals and physician groups whose physicians practice there are often targets for relators who probe the relationships and agreements for violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) or the Stark Law. In the Sixth Circuit, the AKS path narrowed in 2023, when United States ex rel. Martin v. Hathaway, 63 F.4th 1043 (6th Cir. 2023) (Hathaway), held that “remuneration” required a payment or transfer of value, not simply any act that may be valuable to another. On October 9, 2026, in United States ex rel. Shahbabian v. TriHealth, Inc. (Shahbabian), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio applied Hathaway to a qui tam challenging a Cincinnati hospital system’s arrangement with the region’s largest independent neurosurgery group. In July 2025, the same court had allowed a companion qui tam against the same hospital system, United States ex rel. Murphy v. TriHealth, Inc. (Murphy), to proceed. This time it dismissed without prejudice, giving the relator 30 days to seek leave to amend, and made three rulings. First, the FCA’s first-to-file bar did not apply, because the earlier complaint was legally infirm when this one was filed. Second, the relator had not pleaded any form of remuneration the AKS reaches, and referrals exchanged for referrals did not violate the AKS under Hathaway. Third, although the Stark Law’s personal services exception was an affirmative defense, the relator still had to plead specific facts showing that the compensation exceeded fair market value or was tied to referrals, and he did not.

Background Facts

The co-management agreements and the parties

TriHealth, Inc., the corporate parent of Good Samaritan Hospital and Bethesda North Hospital in Cincinnati, entered co-management agreements in 2014 and 2017 with Mayfield Clinic, Inc., an independent neurosurgery group. TriHealth paid Mayfield for on-call coverage, medical director services, and quality initiatives—$80,417 a month for call coverage under the 2014 agreement, $95,417 a month under the 2017 agreement, and more than $2 million a year in all under the 2017 agreement—and referred its unassigned neurosurgery patients to Mayfield physicians. Shahbabian at *2, *4, *18.

The 2014 agreement required Mayfield to provide “expanded comprehensive neurosurgery services” across the TriHealth system, named a Mayfield shareholder as Medical Director of Neurosurgery for the TriHealth Surgical Institute at Good Samaritan, and provided that TriHealth would pay Mayfield an additional $175,000 a year if Mayfield met quality initiative targets. It also required TriHealth to refer all emergency and unassigned neurosurgery patients at both hospitals to Mayfield physicians. A later amendment detailed Mayfield’s services; the complaint alleged that no fair market value determination was done. Both agreements expressly prohibited compensation tied to “the volume or value of referrals or other business generated” for TriHealth. Id. at *2–3, *18.

Dr. Set Shahbabian, a neurosurgeon who had operated at Good Samaritan since the late 1960s and became a TriHealth employee in 2014, alleged in his qui tam complaint that the arrangements were a quid pro quo. He alleged that TriHealth transitioned his practice and referral base to Mayfield, invested more than $46 million in neurosurgery facilities and elevated Mayfield’s referral status, and that Mayfield, in return, moved thousands of procedures it had been performing at UC Health to TriHealth hospitals. He filed this qui tam on January 27, 2020. Id. at *2, *5–6.

The alleged exchange

According to the qui tam complaint, new TriHealth leadership set out in 2015 and 2016 to grow its neurosurgery business. At the time, TriHealth employed only two neurosurgeons, and about 80% of Mayfield’s procedures were done at TriHealth’s competitor, UC Health. In April 2016, the complaint alleged, TriHealth offered to transition Dr. Shahbabian’s referral base to Mayfield in exchange for Mayfield redirecting its cases, and Mayfield asked for hospital privileges for one of its surgeons, disclosure of TriHealth’s planned investment, and a commitment to the transition. A January 2017 email to TriHealth executives laid out an estimated $47.6 million in strategic-plan investments, the co-management fees and projected case volumes by physician. Id. at *3–4.

The complaint alleged that what followed was part of the same plan. On May 2, 2017, TriHealth told Dr. Shahbabian that his employment agreement would not be renewed when it expired in April 2019, a step the complaint described as the next stage of the scheme. A week later, TriHealth and Mayfield signed the 2017 co-management agreement, which the complaint said formally consummated the scheme. A week after that, according to the complaint, TriHealth forced Dr. Shahbabian to stop operating by threatening internal review and a report to the Ohio State Medical Board over alleged quality-of-care issues, transferred his scheduled surgeries to other physicians, and, after Dr. Tempel of Mayfield arrived that July, directed Dr. Shahbabian’s referring physicians to send their cases to Dr. Tempel. Unaware of the arrangement with Mayfield, he reluctantly resigned his privileges. Id. at *4.

To comply with Rule 9(b)’s requirement to plead fraud with particularity, the complaint identified one Medicare beneficiary, an unassigned patient referred to Mayfield under the agreement, and listed the physician, hospital, and third-party claims submitted for that patient’s care, with amounts billed and paid. It pleaded four counts under 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1)(A), (B), (C) and (G), each resting on the alleged AKS and Stark violations for falsity. Id. at *4–5.

The related litigation

Before filing this qui tam, Dr. Shahbabian sued TriHealth and Mayfield in his personal capacity in 2018, alleging breach of contract, age and disability discrimination, and fraud, on the theory that they had conspired to force him out because of his age. In that case, a different judge dismissed his claims on summary judgment and held that he had to repay TriHealth $679,711.61 of his earnings for failing to meet the surgical-volume requirements of his employment agreement. Shahbabian v. TriHealth, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-790, 2021 WL 3110073, at *13–18 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2021), aff’d, Nos. 21-3762, 22-3479, 2023 WL 2424603, at *6 (6th Cir. Mar. 9, 2023).

Murphy, the companion qui tam, was filed in March 2019 by Timothy Murphy, TriHealth’s former Physician Practices Chief Financial Officer, against TriHealth and two TriHealth affiliates. It alleged similar AKS and Stark violations, claiming TriHealth paid Mayfield physicians in exchange for referrals. Mayfield was not named as a defendant in Murphy. The government declined to intervene in both cases, and at the relator’s request in Murphy, the court decided related issues in the two cases together. On July 28, 2025, the court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss in Murphy on all grounds, United States ex rel. Murphy v. TriHealth, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-168, 2025 WL 2104279, at *18 (S.D. Ohio July 28, 2025), and certified for interlocutory appeal the question whether the FCA’s qui tam provisions violate the Appointments and Take Care Clauses. The same day, in Shahbabian, it rejected the same constitutional and standing arguments, stayed the case, and put off the remaining motions. After the Sixth Circuit declined to hear the interlocutory appeal, Murphy moved into discovery, and Dr. Shahbabian moved to consolidate the two cases. Shahbabian at *5–7.

Legal Analysis

1. The first-to-file bar

  • The court measured the earlier complaint as it stood when this suit was filed. The defendants argued that Murphy, filed ten months earlier and still pending, barred this case under the FCA’s first-to-file rule, which provides that once a qui tam is filed, “no person other than the government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending action.” 31 U.S.C. §3730(b)(5). Under Sixth Circuit authority, though, an earlier complaint bars a later one only if it is not legally infirm—that is, only if it satisfies Rule 9(b). Shahbabian at *8 (citing United States ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 F.3d 503, 516 (6th Cir. 2009), abrogated in part on other grounds by United States ex rel. Rahimi v. Rite Aid Corp., 3 F.4th 813 (6th Cir. 2021), and Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 972–73 (6th Cir. 2005)). Dr. Shahbabian argued that the bar didn’t apply because the Murphy complaint failed Rule 9(b) and, independently, because it didn’t allege the same essential facts. Id. That raised a threshold question: which Murphy complaint counted? The court had already upheld Murphy’s current, second amended complaint, so if that pleading counted, the infirmity argument would fail. Dr. Shahbabian argued that the relevant pleading was the original Murphy complaint on file when he sued. The court agreed with him, holding that the first-to-file analysis looks to the facts as they existed when the later action was brought. Id. at *9 (citing United States ex rel. Cestra v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 14-01842, 2014 WL 5038393, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2014)).
  • The original Murphy complaint did not satisfy Rule 9(b). Measured against that original complaint, Dr. Shahbabian’s Rule 9(b) argument succeeded. Under United States ex rel. Owsley v. Fazzi Associates, Inc., 16 F.4th 192, 196–97 (6th Cir. 2021), a relator alleging a fraudulent scheme must either identify a representative claim actually submitted for payment, or allege facts, based on personal knowledge of billing practices, supporting a strong inference that particular identified claims were submitted, with dates and amounts. Shahbabian at *9–10. The original Murphy complaint made only generalized assertions, such as that “TriHealth physicians submitted thousands of CMS 1500 forms to CMS.” Id. at *9. The court noted that the relator in Murphy later attached specific claims to an amended complaint. Id. at *10. Because the original complaint was legally infirm, the bar didn’t apply, and the court didn’t reach whether the two complaints shared the same essential facts. Id. at *8, *10.

2. The Anti-Kickback Statute: remuneration

  • The case turned on a single element. All four of Dr. Shahbabian’s FCA counts depended on showing that the claims were false, and his only theory of falsity was that they resulted from AKS and Stark violations. Id. at *11. The AKS makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully offer, pay, solicit or receive “any remuneration” in return for, or to induce, referrals of items or services paid for by a federal health care program, 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b(b)(1)–(2), and a claim “that includes items or services resulting from a violation” of the AKS is false for FCA purposes, id. §1320a-7b(g). Of those elements, the defendants contested only one: whether anything TriHealth and Mayfield exchanged was “remuneration.” They didn’t dispute the AKS’s “knowingly and willfully” element (although they challenged FCA scienter elsewhere), and the court observed that “there is no question that TriHealth and Mayfield voluntarily entered into several agreements with one another to provide medical services, received federal reimbursement for those services, and referred patients to one another.” Shahbabian at *11 & n.7. Nor did the defendants dispute that Mayfield physicians moving their own procedures to TriHealth hospitals were making “referrals”; the court found that they were. Id. at *14 n.9. The statute doesn’t define “remuneration,” but in Hathaway the Sixth Circuit held that the term “customarily requires a payment or transfer of some kind,” rejecting the argument of the relator and the government that it reaches “any act that may be valuable to another.” Hathaway at 1048–52.
  • Six alleged forms of remuneration. Reading the complaint, the court identified six things TriHealth allegedly gave Mayfield in exchange for Mayfield’s redirected patients, which generated between about $100 million and $119 million in facility fees for TriHealth: (1) the transition of Dr. Shahbabian’s practice and referral base, some 270 to 300 procedures a year; (2) more than $2 million a year in payments under the 2017 co-management agreement; (3) more than $46 million in neurosurgery facility upgrades; (4) hospital privileges for a Mayfield surgeon; (5) “Tier 1” referral status for Mayfield physicians; and (6) the referral of all unassigned neurosurgical patients to Mayfield. Because the AKS prohibits both paying and receiving remuneration, any one of these, if adequately pleaded, would have sufficed. The court held that none was. Shahbabian at *12.
  • Hospital privileges and facility investment weren’t payments or transfers of value, and so weren’t remuneration. Granting a Mayfield surgeon admitting privileges might have had value to him and to Mayfield, but the court treated it as the kind of “act that may be valuable to another” that Hathaway excluded, observing that otherwise an AKS violation would seem to arise every time a hospital credentialed a doctor who brought patients along. Id. TriHealth’s investment of more than $46 million in its own neurosurgery facilities tracked Hathaway’s example of a hospital upgrading its facilities to attract doctors: a hospital investing in itself isn’t paying or transferring anything to the doctors, even if they use the facilities to treat their own patients. Id. at *12 (citing Hathaway at 1050). The court left room for a different case, in which upgrades begin to look like individual perks for referring physicians, such as free designer lab coats. Id.
  • Cash under the co-management agreements could be remuneration, but only if tied to referrals. The defendants conceded that the co-management agreements involved actual transfers of funds, which could qualify as remuneration under Hathaway, but argued that the payments were for the services Mayfield provided, not for referrals. Id. at *13. Dr. Shahbabian alleged that the agreements were entered into without any valid fair market value determination and took into account the anticipated volume and value of referrals. Id. Calling it “concededly a close call,” the court held that the complaint didn’t plausibly tie the compensation to referrals. It alleged no facts showing that compensation fluctuated with referral volume or exceeded market rates, beyond conclusory assertions that no fair market value determination was done and that the quality program was a sham. Id. A consultant’s 2016 email that listed projected case volumes alongside a new co-management agreement showed a broader plan to deepen the relationship, but not that the compensation was paid to induce referrals; to hold otherwise, the court said, it would have to read the AKS to bar any doctor paid by a hospital from referring patients there. Id. at *14. The relator’s own exhibits included an email from TriHealth’s general counsel calling for metrics “not related to volume/value of physician referrals.” Id. at *13. In a footnote, the court reserved whether a fair-market-value contract awarded to a physician group in order to induce referrals might itself be remuneration, because the relator hadn’t argued that theory. Id. at *13 n.8.
  • Referrals exchanged for referrals weren’t remuneration. That left four theories—the facility-fee revenue TriHealth earned on redirected cases, the transition of Dr. Shahbabian’s practice, Mayfield’s elevation to Tier 1 referral status, and the unassigned-patient referral policy—which shared what the court called a common defect: the only thing of value that changed hands was, at its core, a referral. Id. at *14. The question was whether referrals themselves, with no other payment or transfer, could be remuneration. Dr. Shahbabian said yes, relying on Southern District of New York decisions treating patient information and referrals as remuneration, State of New York v. MedImmune, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 3d 544, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), and United States ex rel. Kester v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 41 F. Supp. 3d 323, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The court instead followed Hathaway. There, the Sixth Circuit held that a hospital’s decision not to hire an in-house ophthalmologist, which preserved a stream of referrals to and from a competing provider, wasn’t remuneration, and observed in dicta that, “[e]ven under an anything-of-value definition of remuneration, . . . it is doubtful” that the plaintiffs had alleged a cognizable referrals-for-referrals scheme. Shahbabian at *15 (quoting Hathaway at 1051). The court acknowledged that Hathaway turned partly on the hospital’s inaction, which might leave room for a theory based on a new stream of referrals, but agreed with Hathaway’s dicta: because no one holds a definite, existing interest in a potential patient that could be “transferred,” a referral was too far removed from a payment or transfer to qualify. Id.

3. The Stark Law: the personal services exception

  • The court treated Stark exceptions as affirmative defenses. Dr. Shahbabian’s second theory of falsity was the Stark Law, which, subject to exceptions, prohibits a physician from referring Medicare patients for designated health services to an entity with which the physician has a financial relationship, and bars the entity from billing for those services. 42 U.S.C. §1395nn(a). He alleged that ten Mayfield physicians had such a relationship with TriHealth—compensation under the 2014 and 2017 co-management agreements—during the same period in which they referred patients to TriHealth facilities. Shahbabian at *5. The defendants didn’t dispute that a claim violating the Stark Law is false under the FCA, or that the co-management agreements created a financial relationship. Id. at *15–16. Instead, they invoked the personal services exception, 42 U.S.C. §1395nn(e)(3), which covers arrangements of at least a year compensating a physician for specified services, as long as the compensation is set in advance, doesn’t exceed fair market value, and isn’t determined in a manner that takes into account the volume or value of referrals. That raised a question that matters at the pleading stage: whether the relator must plead facts showing that the exception doesn’t apply, or the defendants must prove that it does. Dr. Shahbabian argued that the exception is an affirmative defense, and at least one defendant appeared to concede the point. Following the Third Circuit in United States ex rel. Bookwalter v. UPMC, 946 F.3d 162, 169, 177 (3d Cir. 2019), the court agreed, both because the statute separates the exceptions from the prohibition and because it would be a lot to ask a relator to plead around every exception. Shahbabian at *16–17. On that view, dismissal would be proper only if the complaint itself conclusively established the exception, and it didn’t; Dr. Shahbabian alleged the opposite. Id. at *17.
  • Rule 9(b) and plausibility still required a factual reason to doubt the arrangement. One might think that ended the matter in the relator’s favor, the court said, but it didn’t. Because an FCA claim requires fraud, Rule 9(b) and the plausibility standard still required Dr. Shahbabian to give some reason, grounded in specific facts, to believe that this compensation arrangement was a cover for paying for referrals—that it was “the fraudulent, illegitimate needle in the legitimate-hospital-physician-contract haystack.” Id. The Bookwalter complaint had met that standard with detailed comparisons of specific physicians’ work units and pay against industry benchmarks, medians and 90th percentiles. Id. (citing Bookwalter at 176–77). This complaint offered only an allegation, on information and belief, that no fair market value determination was done, and a $2 million annual figure with no benchmark to compare it against. Id. at *17 (citing United States ex rel. Osheroff v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., No. 1:09-cv-22253, 2012 WL 2871264, at *7 (S.D. Fla. July 12, 2012)).
  • The contracts and the relator’s own exhibits pointed the other way. The court found the on-call rates not per se outrageous, noted that the parties had negotiated them over the years, and concluded that the most plausible inference was fair market value. Both agreements expressly barred volume- or value-based compensation, and the general counsel’s email called for metrics unrelated to referrals. Shahbabian at *18. In a footnote, the court also distinguished productivity-based earnings, which rise as doctors treat more patients, from compensation keyed to the number of patients moved from UC Health. Id. at *18 n.10.

4. The derivative counts

  • The conspiracy and reverse false claims counts fell with the direct counts. Dr. Shahbabian also pleaded a conspiracy count under §3729(a)(1)(C) and a “reverse false claims” count under §3729(a)(1)(G), which reaches a defendant that knowingly conceals or improperly avoids an obligation to pay money to the government, including by retaining an overpayment. Both depended on the same alleged false claims. The conspiracy count fell with the direct counts, and without adequately pleaded false claims, the court couldn’t infer an overpayment the defendants had a duty to repay. Id. at *18–19.

Holding

The court granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions and dismissed the complaint without prejudice, holding that the first-to-file bar didn’t apply, that the complaint didn’t plausibly allege remuneration under the AKS (including on a referrals-for-referrals theory), and that it didn’t plead, with the particularity Rule 9(b) requires, facts suggesting that the compensation fell outside the Stark Law’s personal services exception. The court gave the relator 30 days to move for leave to file an amended complaint, attaching the proposed pleading, and said that otherwise it would direct entry of judgment dismissing the action without prejudice. It denied the motion to consolidate with Murphy as moot, without prejudice to renewal if leave to amend is granted. Shahbabian at *19.

What to Watch

  • The amendment window. Thirty days from October 9 falls on Sunday, November 8, so under Rule 6(a)(1)(C) a motion for leave to amend is due by Monday, November 9, 2026. As of October 28, the docket showed no motion for leave to amend. On October 19, both this case and Murphy were reassigned to a different district judge for all further proceedings, so a new judge will decide any motion to amend and will preside over Murphy going forward. To survive, an amended complaint would need what the court found missing: compensation benchmarks, facts tying pay to referral volume, or the inducement theory the court reserved in its footnote.
  • Murphy, in discovery before the same court. The companion case survived dismissal against TriHealth (Mayfield isn’t a party), and discovery there may surface the kind of compensation and volume facts this complaint lacked. If leave to amend is granted, the consolidation request returns.
  • Referrals for referrals beyond the Sixth Circuit. The court extended Hathaway’s dicta into a holding that a pure referral exchange isn’t remuneration, disagreeing with the Southern District of New York decisions. Hathaway appears to be the only court of appeals decision to address the question, and it did so in dicta; no other circuit appears to have decided it either way. A dismissal without prejudice isn’t yet an appealable vehicle, but a final judgment would put the question to the Sixth Circuit.
  • The constitutional challenge. The court rejected the Appointments and Take Care Clause arguments, and the Sixth Circuit declined interlocutory review. The question remains live elsewhere, with United States ex rel. Zafirov v. Florida Medical Associates, LLC, No. 24-13581 (11th Cir. Sept. 1, 2026), on remand and United States ex rel. Penelow v. Janssen Products, LP, No. 25-1818, still pending in the Third Circuit.

What This Means for Resolving FCA Disputes

Co-management agreements are common, and this decision shows how much of the pleading fight turns on the paper trail. The contract terms barring volume-based compensation and a lawyer’s email calling for referral-neutral metrics—documents the relator himself attached—carried weight with the court at the pleading stage. For hospital systems and physician groups, the decision underscores the value of documented fair-market-value work and referral-neutral metrics. For relators, it underscores that benchmarks and compensation data, not characterizations, are what get an AKS or Stark theory past Rule 9(b).

For anyone evaluating these two cases together, the dismissal isn’t the end of the exposure. Murphy is in discovery before the same court, and Shahbabian may be revived by amendment. Parties weighing a resolution are assessing a case that survived and a case that may return, with the reach of Hathaway in the Sixth Circuit an open question that could narrow or widen the range of outcomes for both.

John Libby is an arbitrator, mediator, and settlement counsel with LibbyADR LLC. This post contains his own summaries of the decisions discussed, prepared for general informational purposes only. The summaries are not intended to be a complete statement of any court’s reasoning, nor should they be taken to indicate how he would rule as an arbitrator in any particular case. In addition, the summaries are not legal advice, nor should they be construed as legal advice. Readers should not act on these posts, but should review the decisions themselves and consult with legal counsel.

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Arbitration Alert: The Ninth Circuit Decides a Pair of Arbitration Award Enforcement Cases Under the New York Convention https://libbyadr.com/lao-v-baldwin-devas-v-antrix-new-york-convention/ https://libbyadr.com/lao-v-baldwin-devas-v-antrix-new-york-convention/#respond Sun, 25 Oct 2026 16:55:15 +0000 https://libbyadr.com/lao-v-baldwin-devas-v-antrix-new-york-convention/ Government of Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Baldwin, No. 25-2562, ___ F.4th ___, 2026 WL 2752349 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 2026) | Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., Nos. 20-36024, 22-35085 & 22-35103, ___ F.4th ___, 2026 WL 2330570 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 2026)

International Arbitration · New York Convention · Award Enforcement · Alter Ego · Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

Introduction

An arbitration award is only worth the assets the prevailing party can reach. Two recurring scenarios arise in collecting on an award. First, the award debtor may be a shell with nothing in it, while the people who ran it weren’t named in the award. Second, the debtor may be an arm of a foreign state that argues it has sovereign immunity and shouldn’t have to answer in a U.S. court at all.

Within five weeks this past summer, the Ninth Circuit addressed both scenarios. On August 12, 2026, in Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd. (Devas), the court held that the arbitration exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) defeated a claim of sovereign immunity by a corporation wholly owned by India, so that a U.S. court could hear a petition to confirm a $562.5 million award against it, and that forum non conveniens wasn’t available to defeat a proceeding under the New York Convention. On September 17, 2026, in Government of Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Baldwin (Lao), the court held that a federal district court had jurisdiction to enforce a foreign award against alleged alter egos who weren’t named as award debtors and didn’t take part in the arbitration, and that the court had to decide the alter-ego theory in that same proceeding.

Executive Summary

John Baldwin and Shawn Scott, two American entrepreneurs, set up a chain of companies to invest in casinos in Laos. Two of those companies, Sanum Investments Ltd. and Lao Holdings N.V., brought investment-treaty arbitrations in Singapore against the Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), and a third arbitration in which Lao PDR intervened. They lost all three. The tribunals dismissed the companies’ claims and ordered them to pay Lao PDR about $5 million in all, mostly for its fees, expenses and costs of the arbitrations. The Singapore courts refused to set the awards aside. In the Ninth Circuit’s words, “Despite repeated attempts, Lao PDR has been unable to collect on these awards.” Government of Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Baldwin, 2026 WL 2752349, at *2.

Lao PDR then petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands to enforce the awards under the New York Convention. It named the two award debtors and, by amendment, Baldwin, Scott and Bridge Capital, LLC, a Northern Mariana Islands company Baldwin and Scott own equally, as the debtors’ alter egos. The district court dismissed Baldwin and Bridge Capital for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that they weren’t parties to the arbitrations and that Lao PDR had to pursue its veil-piercing theory in a separate action. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the liability of the alleged alter egos had to be decided in the same proceeding that enforced the awards.

Devas presents the sovereign immunity scenario. A three-member tribunal of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) found that Antrix, the commercial arm of India’s space agency, had wrongfully repudiated a satellite spectrum lease with Devas, an Indian company, and awarded Devas $562.5 million. A federal district court in Seattle confirmed the award. After a detour to the Supreme Court on personal jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit affirmed on the three remaining threshold questions: that Antrix wasn’t immune from suit, because the FSIA’s arbitration exception applied; that exercising personal jurisdiction over Antrix was consistent with due process; and that forum non conveniens couldn’t be used to dismiss a Convention enforcement proceeding.

Factual Background and Procedural History

The Lao venture and the Singapore awards

Sanum Investments was incorporated in Macau in 2007 and partnered with a Laotian conglomerate, ST Group, to build casinos including the Savan Vegas Casino. Lao Holdings, an Aruba company, was later inserted into the ownership chain above it, and Bridge Capital provided financing. Government of Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Baldwin, 2026 WL 2752349, at *2. By mid-2012, the companies were in disputes with ST Group over management of the casino, and Lao PDR became involved.

Sanum Investments and Lao Holdings then brought two arbitrations against Lao PDR, seated in Singapore, claiming breaches of treaty protections for foreign investors. Both tribunals dismissed the claims on August 6, 2019, and awarded Lao PDR its fees, expenses and costs of the arbitrations: about $1.95 million in the Lao Holdings proceeding and $1.78 million in the Sanum proceeding, or nearly $3.73 million together. A third arbitration, under the rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre, was brought by the companies against San Marco Capital Partners LLC, which Lao PDR had appointed to manage the casino and had indemnified. Lao PDR intervened. That tribunal also dismissed the companies’ claims, in an award dated August 11, 2021, which the Ninth Circuit described as an additional $1.3 million in Lao PDR’s favor. Each time, the companies’ set-aside actions failed in both the High Court of Singapore and the Singapore Court of Appeal, which assessed further costs against them. Government of Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Baldwin, 2026 WL 2752349, at *2–3; Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Baldwin, No. 1:22-cv-00011, ECF No. 111 (D. N. Mar. I. Apr. 3, 2025).

Lao PDR’s collection efforts included an unsuccessful suit in Thailand and a suit against Baldwin and Bridge Capital in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho, dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction in 2022. Government of Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Baldwin, 2026 WL 2752349, at *3. It then filed its petition in the U.S. District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands. In dismissing Baldwin and Bridge Capital, the district court read 9 U.S.C. §207 as confining a confirmation action to one brought “against any other party to the arbitration,” and, relying on the Second Circuit’s decision in Orion Shipping & Trading Co. v. Eastern States Petroleum Corp. of Panama, S.A., 312 F.2d 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1963), held that a confirmation proceeding wasn’t the place to pierce the corporate veil. Government of Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Baldwin, 2026 WL 2752349, at *3. Scott’s own motion to dismiss was stayed pending the appeal.

Devas: from Seattle to the Supreme Court and back

Antrix and Devas signed their satellite spectrum lease in January 2005. Antrix was to build, launch and operate two satellites and lease Devas 70 MHz of India’s S-band spectrum, and Devas was to pay construction and leasing fees. Antrix terminated in February 2011, citing a Government of India policy decision not to provide the spectrum for commercial use. The ICC tribunal, seated in New Delhi, held in September 2015 that Antrix had wrongfully repudiated the agreement. Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., 2026 WL 2330570, at *4 & n.3. Devas petitioned to confirm the award in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington in 2018, and the district court confirmed it. A Ninth Circuit memorandum disposition reversed for lack of minimum contacts, but the Supreme Court held in CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp., 605 U.S. 223, 232 (2025), that the FSIA required no minimum contacts beyond those built into its exceptions to immunity, and remanded for the Ninth Circuit to address Antrix’s remaining arguments. Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., 2026 WL 2330570, at *2, *5. Meanwhile, after the district court confirmed the award, the Indian courts set it aside. Id. at *4 n.4.

Legal Analysis

1. The statutes common to both cases: 9 U.S.C. §§203 and 207

Both decisions turn on Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which implements the New York Convention. Section 202 defines which agreements and awards “fall[] under the Convention”: those “arising out of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial,” other than relationships entirely between U.S. citizens with no reasonable relation to a foreign state. 9 U.S.C. §202. Sections 203 and 207 are key to the two Ninth Circuit decisions discussed here.

Section 203 is the jurisdictional grant. It provides:

“An action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United States. The district courts of the United States . . . shall have original jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding, regardless of the amount in controversy.” 9 U.S.C. §203.

Section 203 opens the federal courts to any proceeding that falls under the Convention, whatever the parties’ citizenship or the amount at stake (subject to §202’s exclusion of relationships entirely between U.S. citizens that have no reasonable relation to a foreign state). It also treats such a proceeding as arising under U.S. law, which, as Devas shows, matters when a foreign state argues that a purely foreign dispute isn’t something U.S. law treats as arbitrable.

Section 207 supplies the procedure and the standard for review and enforcement of an award, providing:

“Within three years after an arbitral award falling under the Convention is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction under this chapter for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the arbitration. The court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the [New York] Convention.” 9 U.S.C. §207.

Section 207 sets a three-year deadline, identifies who may apply and against whom, and makes confirmation mandatory unless the opposing party proves one of the defenses in Article V of the Convention. Although §207 uses the word “confirm,” for a foreign award that term means the Convention’s single “recognition and enforcement” proceeding. Government of Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Baldwin, 2026 WL 2752349, at *6 (citing CBF Indústria de Gusa S/A v. AMCI Holdings, Inc., 850 F.3d 58, 72 (2d Cir. 2017)).

Article V of the New York Convention provides a few, narrow bases for review: incapacity of a party or an invalid arbitration agreement; lack of proper notice or of an opportunity to present one’s case; an award beyond the scope of the submission; a tribunal or procedure not in accordance with the parties’ agreement or the law of the seat; or an award that isn’t yet binding or has been set aside or suspended at the seat. The court may also refuse enforcement on its own if the subject matter isn’t arbitrable under U.S. law or enforcement would violate U.S. public policy. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V(1)–(2), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. A U.S. court doesn’t revisit the tribunal’s findings or its application of the law. Government of Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Baldwin, 2026 WL 2752349, at *5–6.

2. Lao PDR v. Baldwin

  • Section 203 grants jurisdiction; §207 doesn’t take it away. The district court had dismissed Baldwin and Bridge Capital, who were not parties to the underlying arbitration proceedings, on the ground that §207 limited its jurisdiction, and on appeal they defended that ruling as the first of two independent reasons the dismissal was correct. They read the closing phrase of §207, “as against any other party to the arbitration,” as limiting the court’s jurisdiction to proceedings against named parties to the arbitration. The court held that the grant was in §203, and that “Section 207 does not define federal subject matter-jurisdiction over Convention proceedings.” Government of Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Baldwin, 2026 WL 2752349, at *7. Instead, the court explained, §207 set conditions on when, by whom, for what and against whom a proceeding could be brought, and those conditions weren’t jurisdictional because they weren’t “located in a jurisdiction-granting provision.” Id. (quoting Al-Qarqani v. Chevron Corp., 8 F.4th 1018, 1024 (9th Cir. 2021)). A failure to meet a jurisdictional requirement ends the case at the threshold under §203, while a failure to meet a procedural condition is a defense on the merits under §207 and Article V.
  • The alleged alter egos were within the Convention because the petition plausibly tied them to the awards. Holding that §203, not §207, was the jurisdictional grant left the question whether §203 reached Baldwin and Bridge Capital at all. They argued that they could not be held liable because they were neither parties to the arbitrations nor named as award debtors, and no court or tribunal had found them to be alter egos of Sanum Investments or Lao Holdings. Government of Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Baldwin, 2026 WL 2752349, at *3. To decide whether a proceeding “falls under the Convention” and so comes within §203, the Ninth Circuit applied the test from Ministry of Defense of Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould Inc., 887 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1989), drawn from §202: the award must arise out of (1) a legal relationship, (2) that is commercial in nature, and (3) that isn’t entirely domestic in scope. Government of Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Baldwin, 2026 WL 2752349, at *6. The court explained that a petitioner didn’t have to prove those elements to establish jurisdiction: as long as its claim that the award fell under the Convention wasn’t frivolous, or made solely to obtain jurisdiction, the court “must assume jurisdiction and hear the merits.” Id. at *7 (quoting Al-Qarqani v. Chevron Corp., 8 F.4th at 1025). Lao PDR never contracted with Baldwin, Scott or Bridge Capital, but its petition alleged that they dominated the two award debtors so completely that “the separate corporate personalities of each ceased to exist.” Id. Baldwin and Bridge Capital hadn’t argued that the allegations were frivolous, and the court said their merits “are not for us to evaluate.” Id. That was enough to satisfy the first element. The relationship was commercial because it involved disputes over managing the casino, and it wasn’t purely domestic because Lao PDR is a foreign nation. Id. at *8.
  • Enforcement of a foreign award was one proceeding, so the alter-ego question had to be decided in it. Baldwin and Bridge Capital’s second argument was that, even with jurisdiction, the district court could not consider an alter-ego theory in a proceeding to confirm an award, as distinct from a later action to enforce it. That was the district court’s reasoning too: relying on Orion, it held that “[t]he proper mechanism” was for Lao PDR “to bring a separate action.” Id. at *3. Lao PDR argued that the district court had misapplied that Second Circuit precedent. Id. at *4. The Ninth Circuit agreed with Lao PDR. It explained that under the New York Convention, a court asked to enforce an award made abroad recognizes and enforces it in a single proceeding, and that Orion, decided before the United States joined the Convention, didn’t require the creditor to bring a separate veil-piercing action. Id. at *4–5, *8. Because the awards were made in Singapore, the district court “was required to consider the merits of Lao PDR’s petition, including its alter-ego theory, in a single action.” Id. at *8. The court attributed the district court’s error to §207’s use of the word “confirm” and said that “the district court’s confusion was understandable.” Id.
  • The district court’s order dismissing Baldwin and Bridge Capital was appealable. As a threshold matter, Baldwin and Bridge Capital asked the Ninth Circuit to dismiss the appeal, arguing that it lacked appellate jurisdiction because a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction wasn’t an appealable interlocutory order. The court held that, because the district court did have jurisdiction, its order dismissing them functioned as a denial of Lao PDR’s petition to enforce, which 9 U.S.C. §16(a)(1)(D), as incorporated by §208, made immediately appealable. The district court had “incorrectly attached a jurisdictional label to what should have been a decision on the merits.” Id. at *9 (quoting Al-Qarqani v. Chevron Corp., 8 F.4th at 1027).

3. Devas v. Antrix

  • Sovereign immunity: the FSIA’s arbitration exception had no U.S.-nexus requirement. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit took up the alternative arguments Antrix had raised against confirmation, the first being that it was immune from suit. Because Antrix is wholly owned by India, it is treated as a foreign state under the FSIA and is immune from suit in U.S. courts unless an exception applies. The FSIA’s arbitration exception removes that immunity in an action “to confirm an award made pursuant to” an agreement to arbitrate with the foreign state, where the agreement concerns “a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of the United States” and the award “is or may be governed by a treaty . . . calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards,” such as the New York Convention. 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(6); Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., 2026 WL 2330570, at *3. The parties agreed that the action was brought to confirm an award governed by the New York Convention, so the dispute came down to the “subject matter” requirement. Antrix argued that its dispute with Devas, which concerned purely foreign commerce between two Indian companies, lacked any commercial nexus to the United States and so did not concern a subject matter capable of arbitration under U.S. law. The court rejected the argument on the text: the exception “contains no requirement that the underlying commerce that is the subject of the arbitration have a nexus with the United States,” while the FSIA’s commercial-activity exception does. Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., 2026 WL 2330570, at *5. And because §203 deems a Convention proceeding to arise under U.S. law, the court reasoned, an award covered by the Convention concerned an arbitrable subject matter. Id. at *6.
  • Personal jurisdiction was reasonable even assuming due process applied. The FSIA provides that personal jurisdiction over a foreign state exists whenever an exception to immunity applies and the state has been served, 28 U.S.C. §1330(b), and the Supreme Court had held that the statute required no separate minimum-contacts showing. Antrix argued that, even so, exercising personal jurisdiction over it would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., 2026 WL 2330570, at *7. The Supreme Court’s decision in Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 606 U.S. 1, 16, 23–24 (2025), had declined to import the Fourteenth Amendment’s minimum-contacts test into the Fifth Amendment, without deciding whether the Fifth Amendment requires any reasonableness inquiry at all. Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., 2026 WL 2330570, at *7. Assuming without deciding that Antrix was a “person” protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the court found jurisdiction reasonable under the three factors Fuld applied: the U.S. interest in honoring its treaty obligations, the modest burden on a sophisticated state-owned company, and Devas’s need for a forum that could reach U.S. assets. Id. at *7–8.
  • Forum non conveniens had no place in a Convention proceeding. Antrix’s third argument was that the district court should have dismissed Devas’s petition under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which lets a court decline a case that would more appropriately be heard elsewhere, in favor of litigation in India. Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., 2026 WL 2330570, at *8. The district court had declined to dismiss on that ground. Id. at *4. Deciding a question of first impression in the circuit, the Ninth Circuit held that the doctrine “does not apply to an action to confirm a foreign arbitral award under the New York Convention.” Id. at *8. It reasoned first from the text: Article III requires each signatory to “recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them,” and Article V’s exclusive list of defenses doesn’t include an inconvenient forum. Id. The court added that, given the Convention’s purpose of unifying enforcement standards, “[a] discretionary, forum-by-forum defense to enforcement that would let each signatory state decline enforcement on convenience grounds is irreconcilable with the design of the Convention.” Id. The structure of an enforcement action led to the same place: forum non conveniens presupposes an adequate alternative forum, and only a U.S. court can reach a foreign state’s commercial property located here. Id. at *4, *9. Although Antrix was a state-owned company, the holding was stated without regard to who the respondent is, and the text-and-purpose reasoning applies equally to a private party; only the structural point was framed in terms of a foreign state’s U.S. assets. The court aligned itself with the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Tatneft v. Ukraine, 21 F.4th 829, 840 (D.C. Cir. 2021), and acknowledged that the Second Circuit reached a different result under the Panama Convention in Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, 665 F.3d 384, 391–92 (2d Cir. 2011), finding the dissent there “more persuasive.” Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., 2026 WL 2330570, at *9 & n.8.

Holding

In Lao, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Baldwin and Bridge Capital and remanded with instructions to consider the merits of Lao PDR’s petition to enforce, including its alter-ego theory as to Baldwin, Bridge Capital and Scott. It held that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. §203, that §207’s “party to the arbitration” language wasn’t jurisdictional, and that the order was appealable under §16(a)(1)(D). Government of Lao People’s Democratic Republic v. Baldwin, 2026 WL 2752349, at *9. In Devas, the court affirmed as to subject-matter jurisdiction under the FSIA’s arbitration exception, 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(6), personal jurisdiction, and forum non conveniens, which it held unavailable in an action to confirm a foreign award under the Convention. In a concurrently filed memorandum disposition, the court affirmed confirmation of the award and registration of the judgment as to Devas Multimedia America, Inc., reversed and vacated as to the Shareholder Intervenors’ standing to register the judgment, and remanded for the district court to address the effect of the Indian set-aside proceedings in the first instance. Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., 2026 WL 2330570, at *10.

What to Watch

  • The alter-ego merits on remand, and how much the district court will review. Lao settles where the alter-ego question gets decided, not how. As to the awards themselves, the district court’s review is narrow: it must enforce them unless an Article V ground is proved, and it can’t revisit the tribunals’ decisions. Whether Baldwin, Scott and Bridge Capital are bound by the awards is a different question, one the tribunals never decided, and the Ninth Circuit directed the district court to evaluate it on the merits. The opinion doesn’t say what law governs veil-piercing for companies incorporated in Macau and Aruba, what standard of proof applies, or whether the court may take evidence. Scott’s stayed motion to dismiss is also back in play.
  • Defenses beyond jurisdiction. Whether the alleged alter egos can invoke Article V defenses, or §207’s other conditions such as its three-year deadline, wasn’t before the court. Personal jurisdiction remains a separate hurdle, as the Idaho dismissal shows.
  • Annulment at the seat. The Lao awards survived set-aside in Singapore. The Devas award didn’t survive in India, and the Ninth Circuit left the effect of that annulment to the district court. Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., 2026 WL 2330570, at *4 n.4, *10. Article V(1)(e) permits, but doesn’t require, a court to refuse enforcement of an award set aside at the seat, so that remand will address what an annulment does to a U.S. judgment already confirming the award.
  • Forum non conveniens across circuits. The Ninth and D.C. Circuits agree that forum non conveniens isn’t available in proceedings to confirm foreign awards. The Second Circuit’s contrary Figueiredo decision arose under the Panama Convention, so this isn’t a clean split, but respondents, sovereign or private, may continue to press the difference. The Devas court also reserved whether a transfer between U.S. districts under 28 U.S.C. §1404 could be appropriate. Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., 2026 WL 2330570, at *9 n.9.
  • Further review. Absent rehearing petitions, petitions for certiorari would be due 90 days after judgment, on or about November 10, 2026, in Devas and December 16, 2026, in Lao.

What This Means for Resolving International Arbitration Disputes

An award against a thinly capitalized company typically carries a discount, because the creditor’s realistic path runs through a second lawsuit, in a court with personal jurisdiction over the alter egos, on a veil-piercing theory decided from scratch. Lao doesn’t remove the veil-piercing question, but it requires the creditor to raise it in the enforcement proceeding itself, against the people and affiliates alleged to stand behind the debtor. Devas offers another path: no respondent, whether a state-owned company or a private one, can use forum non conveniens to send the creditor to another country’s courts when the assets at issue are here, and a U.S. court is the only one that can reach them.

Where the debtor is a shell, the negotiation shifts from whether the award will ever be collected to what the owners’ own exposure is worth. Where the debtor has assets in the United States, sovereign or private, it shifts away from the forum and toward the narrow Article V defenses and, as in Devas, the status of the award at the seat. Those questions have more definable ranges, which gives both sides a firmer basis for valuing the award. The open issues, especially the alter-ego merits and the effect of an annulment at the seat, will still separate the parties’ numbers.

John Libby is an arbitrator, mediator, and settlement counsel with LibbyADR LLC. This post contains his own summaries of the decisions discussed, prepared for general informational purposes only. The summaries are not intended to be a complete statement of any court’s reasoning, nor should they be taken to indicate how he would rule as an arbitrator in any particular case. In addition, the summaries are not legal advice, nor should they be construed as legal advice. Readers should not act on these posts, but should review the decisions themselves and consult with legal counsel.

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FCA Case Spotlight: District of Massachusetts Finds Insufficient Evidence of Remuneration or Willfulness in Janssen’s Infusion-Suite Support Programs https://libbyadr.com/long-v-janssen-aks-practice-support/ https://libbyadr.com/long-v-janssen-aks-practice-support/#respond Sun, 18 Oct 2026 15:44:40 +0000 https://libbyadr.com/long-v-janssen-aks-practice-support/ United States ex rel. Long v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-12182-FDS, 2026 WL 2949353 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2026)

Healthcare / False Claims Act · Anti-Kickback Statute · Manufacturer Practice Support · Scienter

Introduction

Manufacturers of physician-administered drugs have long supported the practices that administer them, with reimbursement hotlines, coding guides, nurse training, and advice on operating an infusion suite. Relators have argued that some of that support is really free business consulting, and that free consulting given in conjunction with prescriptions is illegal remuneration under the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS). Manufacturers have responded that support tied to their own products is part of what providers purchase along with the infusion drugs. Courts have analyzed those claims using a “substantial independent value” test drawn from guidance of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: support that has value to the practice apart from the manufacturer’s product can be remuneration, while support whose value depends on the product generally is not.

In United States ex rel. Hart v. McKesson Corp., 602 F. Supp. 3d 575, 589–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2022), aff’d in relevant part, 96 F.4th 145 (2d Cir. 2024), allegations about a free “Margin Analyzer” survived dismissal under the “substantial independent value” test. On September 30, 2026, after nearly ten years of litigation, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment for Janssen Biotech in a qui tam case the government declined to join, over Janssen’s programs supporting practices that infuse Remicade and Simponi ARIA in their own offices. The court made two rulings. First, the relator had not produced evidence that the services had value independent of Janssen’s drugs. Second, and in the alternative, she had not produced evidence that Janssen acted knowingly and willfully in violation of the AKS, and therefore of the False Claims Act (FCA).

Executive Summary

Janssen makes Remicade and Simponi ARIA, two infused biologics usually prescribed by rheumatologists and gastroenterologists. Through a team of Area Business Specialists (ABSs), it offered physician practices programming on setting up and operating in-office infusion suites, covering billing and coding, staffing, scheduling, specialty pharmacies, and suite efficiency. Julie Long, an ABS in central Pennsylvania from 2003 to early 2016, filed a qui tam action in 2016 alleging that the programming was free business consulting that amounted to AKS kickbacks and tainted the resulting claims under the FCA. The United States and the states declined to intervene. After discovery limited to her territory and to national or regional policies that applied to her work, Janssen moved for summary judgment on the whole case, and Long cross-moved on scienter.

The court granted Janssen’s motion and denied Long’s. It applied the substantial independent value framework, rejected Janssen’s First Amendment argument, and held that the evidence did not show remuneration. It then held that Long had not shown a knowing and willful violation. Because there was no triable AKS violation, the court did not reach Janssen’s FCA-specific arguments or its constitutional challenges to the qui tam provisions.

Background

The programs, and what the relator conceded

Janssen ran two field teams working with infusion centers. Immunology Specialists detailed the drugs’ clinical benefits at the sites where they were prescribed. ABSs worked at the “Site of Care,” where patients were infused. Janssen’s position was that in-office suites widen patient access and reduce “attrition” by patients who get a prescription but never complete their infusions. 2026 WL 2949353, at *2, *4. A multidisciplinary Promotional Review Committee, including in-house lawyers, approved all written programming. Janssen did not assert an advice-of-counsel defense and did not waive privilege over the lawyers’ communications, so the record showed that the committee approved the materials but not what the lawyers advised. Id. at *5 & n.3. Compliance policies told ABSs they were “not business advisors” and could not offer “consulting services that relate to the management of customers’ business practices.” Id. at *9.

Two features of the record shaped the case. First, Long expressly conceded, in a discovery dispute and again at summary judgment, that the approved slide decks and written materials were not unlawful remuneration. Her theory was that ABSs and outside consultants delivered unlawful “live” services that went beyond those materials. Id. at *2, *15–16. Second, she offered no affidavit of her own, no testimony from any other ABS, and no testimony from any physician or practice manager. The court found “no direct evidence at all of the content of any oral communication between any ABS and any physician practice.” Id. at *16.

The IOM

The court described the Infusion Optimization Modeler (IOM) as the “closest” Long came to establishing an AKS violation. Id. at *3. An ABS took a practice’s data on its Remicade patients, infusion chairs, and staff hours, ran it through a relatively simple program, and produced a printout showing which resource constrained the practice and how many more infusions per week it could deliver if that constraint were removed. Id. at *8–9, *23. In Long’s words, the practice then “had to take the bull by the horns” and make any changes itself. Id. at *23.

The procedural path

Long filed on October 28, 2016. Over the next eight years the court dismissed the state-law claims, trimmed the federal claims on limitations grounds, and denied a public-disclosure-bar motion. Id. at *10. Rather than order nationwide discovery, the court limited the first phase to Long’s territory and to national or regional policies that applied to her work, and allowed Janssen to test the case by summary judgment at the end of that phase. Id.

Legal Analysis

  • The court applied the substantial independent value framework. The court reasoned that a literal reading of “remuneration” “would make virtually all pharmaceutical detailing or marketing a crime.” Id. at *11. It followed OIG Advisory Opinion No. 00-10 (Dec. 15, 2000) and the 2003 Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,731, 23,735 (May 5, 2003), noting that “every court to have considered the issue” had done so. Id. at *12. It added that, after Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), OIG’s views get no deference. 2026 WL 2949353, at *12 n.9.
    • The relator’s challenge to the framework. Long argued that the framework should not apply at all. The court called the argument “perhaps not frivolous” but undeveloped, and declined “to blaze a new trail” given that the AKS is a felony statute whose terms are interpreted the same way in civil and criminal cases. Id. at *13.
    • The guideposts. Medical, clinical, and technical support, and billing and reimbursement advice for the product, are permissible. Business or management advice about the overall practice, or doing tasks that are part of a physician’s overhead, are not. Id. at *13–14. In between, “the landscape is unclear,” and the court said those cases turn on “the actual evidence,” not “conclusory labels.” Id. at *14.
  • The First Amendment did not narrow “remuneration.” Janssen argued that treating truthful promotional speech as illegal remuneration would raise constitutional concerns, so the term should be read narrowly. Long responded that the First Amendment does not shield illegal inducements that happen to involve communication. The court rejected Janssen’s argument, reasoning that the AKS regulates conduct, and that “where valuable speech is offered as the quid in a quid pro quo arrangement, prohibiting such arrangements would clearly survive First Amendment scrutiny.” Id. at *14–15.
  • The question was not whether the programs were valuable, but whether their value was independent of Janssen’s drugs. The court accepted that the programming had substantial value and that its ultimate purpose was to sell more Remicade and Simponi ARIA. Id. at *20. Under the framework, support lacks “independent” value if its value “would not exist if the products did not exist.” Id. Long’s arguments failed on that point.
    • Other drugs. Long argued the suites could be used for other infused drugs. The court found her evidence consisted, “in substance, of a single sentence by a single witness,” a Janssen Rule 30(b)(6) designee’s acknowledgment that the programs would interest physicians who wanted to infuse other products. Id. at *21.
    • Scale and price. Long pointed to the magnitude of the programs and to the roughly $3,000 per session Janssen paid the outside firm Xcenda to deliver them. The court held that size and cost show value and importance to Janssen, but not independence. Id. at *21–22 & n.23.
    • Tailoring. Customized advice is “relevant, but it is not controlling,” since a device representative assisting a surgeon gives tailored advice that still is not independent of the product. Id. at *22.
    • The IOM. The court assumed the IOM fell outside Long’s concession and treated it as an extension of the approved “Managing Biologics in the Physician Office” deck to a specific practice. Because it was used only with practices already infusing Janssen’s drugs, and the record held no evidence on other infusible products or their infusion times, the court held that “if Remicade and Simponi ARIA did not exist, the IOM would have no value.” Id. at *23–24 & n.25. It distinguished Hart, where the tool compared the profitability of competing drugs, employees reviewed “key areas of improvement” with practices quarterly, and another McKesson division sold the same tools. Id. at *24.
  • Scienter was decided in the alternative. Having found no remuneration, the court could have ended its analysis. “Rather than stop at that point,” it also took up willfulness, which gives the ruling a second, independent basis. Id. at *24. Under United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hospital Rental Service, Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 33 (1st Cir. 1989), and 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(h), the relator must show knowledge that the conduct is unlawful and intent to violate the law, but not intent to violate the AKS specifically. 2026 WL 2949353, at *25.
    • A corporate scienter framework. Adapting United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 855–56 (1st Cir. 1987), the court applied the collective knowledge doctrine to “knowingly,” so that the corporation’s knowledge includes everything its employees knew collectively. For “willfully,” it required evidence that an employee acting within the scope of employment intended to violate the law, or that the corporation was “flagrantly indifferent” to its legal obligations. 2026 WL 2949353, at *25–26. It noted that the D.C. Circuit has rejected collective knowledge for FCA scienter in United States v. Science Applications International Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2010), that the First Circuit has not addressed the question, and that it was applying the doctrine to the AKS. 2026 WL 2949353, at *25 n.27.
    • Concealment. Long pointed to compliance edits, such as changing “Operational Efficiency” to “Access Support for our IV Therapies,” and a direction to talk about patient growth rather than vial growth. The court held that it would be unreasonable to read a compliance officer’s suggested changes as concealment, and that “all four instances involved cautions or reminders that ABSs should steer clear of business discussions.” Id. at *27–28.
    • Internal warnings. Compliance staff had flagged “potential risk[s]” and “compliance sensitivities,” including the risk that the programs could be seen as offsetting a practice’s start-up costs. The court held this showed “compliance officers who did their jobs,” and that treating it as willfulness would effectively punish Janssen “for having a compliance department at all.” Id. at *28–29.
    • Institutional history and policies. Prior settlements and a Corporate Integrity Agreement with OIG showed awareness of the AKS, which was not disputed. Id. at *29. Long’s syllogism—that the policies barred consulting, the programs were consulting, and so the violation was willful—failed because compliance personnel approved the programming and no witness believed it was unlawful consulting. Id. at *3, *29–30. Long herself testified that she did not believe at the time that she was providing a kickback. Id. at *31. A training slide saying there is “a lot of gray” in healthcare compliance was, in context, “perfectly accurate,” not an invitation to break the law. Id.
  • Disclosure to the government carried limited weight. Janssen argued that it openly disclosed the programs to federal authorities and so could not have intended to conceal them. The court called that evidence relevant but “of limited value,” because the government may not appreciate a disclosure or have resources to follow up. Id. at *26 n.28.

Holding

Janssen’s motion for summary judgment was granted, and Long’s cross-motion on scienter was denied. The court held that, drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, Long had not produced evidence that Janssen provided services with substantial independent value to induce purchases of Remicade or Simponi ARIA. Id. at *24. Independently, she produced “no evidence that any individual employee of Janssen had the necessary intent to violate the law,” and the evidence fell “well short” of showing corporate flagrant indifference. Id. at *31. The court rejected Janssen’s First Amendment argument. It did not reach Janssen’s FCA-specific arguments or its Appointments Clause and Take Care Clause challenges to the qui tam provisions. Id. at *11 n.8, *31. The court entered judgment on October 6, 2026. Judgment, Long, No. 1:16-cv-12182-FDS (D. Mass. Oct. 6, 2026), ECF No. 674.

What to Watch

  • An appeal to the First Circuit. Because the court rested on two independent grounds, Long would need to overturn both. Judgment was entered on October 6, 2026, so a notice of appeal is due by November 5, 2026. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). As of October 18, 2026, none had been filed.
  • Collective knowledge and AKS scienter. The court adapted the First Circuit’s corporate scienter standard from Bank of New England, a Currency Transaction Reporting Act case, to the AKS, and applied the collective knowledge doctrine to the AKS’s “knowingly” element. It did so even though the D.C. Circuit has held that collective knowledge is “an inappropriate basis for proof of scienter” under the FCA, reasoning that the AKS’s statutory language differs from the FCA’s. 2026 WL 2949353, at *25 n.27 (quoting Science Applications International Corp., 626 F.3d at 1274). The First Circuit has not addressed whether collective knowledge can establish FCA scienter, id., and the opinion cites no First Circuit decision applying the doctrine to the AKS, so an appeal would give the First Circuit the chance to decide whether the court’s approach is right.
  • The middle of the independent-value spectrum. The court described the line between product support and practice management advice as “ill-defined” and “far from precise.” Id. at *3, *13. The court contrasted Hart and United States ex rel. Witkin v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-10790-IT, 2024 WL 1892405, at *17 (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2024), with United States ex rel. Forney v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 5:15-cv-06264-EGS, 2017 WL 2653568, at *1, *4 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 2017). 2026 WL 2949353, at *13. Because the independence test turned on whether the programs would have had value without Janssen’s drugs, evidence that the same tools served other infusible drugs was the missing piece here. The court noted that a 2013 IOM printout had lines for “other infusions” that neither party addressed. Id. at *8 n.6. That is the gap future relators are likely to try to fill.
  • The constitutional challenge left unresolved. Janssen’s Article II challenge to the qui tam provisions was raised but not decided. It would remain available to Janssen if the judgment were reversed.

What This Means for Resolving FCA Disputes

A practice-support case turns on two evidentiary questions. Was the help part of the product or a freestanding benefit? And, on the knowledge and willfulness element, did anyone at the company understand that the help crossed the line into unlawful remuneration? Long shows how a manufacturer with documented compliance review can make the second question hard for a relator to answer. Compliance staff approved the programs, flagged risks, and saw their edits adopted, and the court read that record as diligence, not knowledge. A relator who cannot produce a witness saying the conduct was understood to be unlawful, or a document showing that warnings were ignored, faces a steep climb on scienter even where the remuneration question is close.

That changes how these cases are valued. Exposure in an AKS-predicated FCA case multiplies through trebling and per-claim penalties. But a scienter element that turns on specific evidence of intent discounts all of it, and the defendant’s own compliance record largely sets the amount of the discount. Relator’s counsel will want first-hand witnesses and documents showing that warnings went unheeded. Defense counsel will want to show how compliance review actually worked, which may mean deciding early whether privileged legal review becomes part of the story. Where the record is thin on both sides, an early discovery phase like the one the court used here gives the parties a shared view of the evidence before the full cost of nationwide discovery, and that tends to be when these cases are most resolvable.

John Libby is an arbitrator, mediator, and settlement counsel with LibbyADR LLC. This post contains his own summaries of the decisions discussed, prepared for general informational purposes only. The summaries are not intended to be a complete statement of any court’s reasoning, nor should they be taken to indicate how he would rule as an arbitrator in any particular case. In addition, the summaries are not legal advice, nor should they be construed as legal advice. Readers should not act on these posts, but should review the decisions themselves and consult with legal counsel.

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FCA Case Spotlight: An Indiana Federal Court Holds That Medicaid’s Failure to Recoup Contractor-Flagged Overpayments Does Not Defeat Materiality at the Pleading Stage https://libbyadr.com/mccullough-v-anthem-medicaid-recoupment-materiality/ https://libbyadr.com/mccullough-v-anthem-medicaid-recoupment-materiality/#respond Sun, 18 Oct 2026 11:57:32 +0000 https://libbyadr.com/mccullough-v-anthem-medicaid-recoupment-materiality/ United States ex rel. McCullough v. Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-00325-TWP-TAB, 2026 WL 2448954 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 20, 2026)

Healthcare / False Claims Act · Medicaid Managed Care · Materiality · Government Knowledge

Introduction

In Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176, 194 (2016), the Supreme Court held that the materiality requirement of the False Claims Act (FCA) is “demanding,” and that the government’s own response to known violations is strong evidence of whether they matter. If the government “pays a particular claim in full despite its actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated, that is very strong evidence that those requirements are not material.” Id. at 195. The same is true if the government “regularly pays a particular type of claim in full despite actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated, and has signaled no change in position.” Id. Escobar did not define the government’s “actual knowledge,” and lower courts are still working out whether an agency knows of a violation when the information is in its files or in its own contractor’s reports, but the officials who decide whether to pay or recover never reviewed or understood it.

In United States ex rel. McCullough v. Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana recently faced this issue at the pleading stage. There, two former Indiana state officials alleged that four Medicaid managed care entities and six hospital systems were paid on improper claims that IBM’s algorithms had identified, even though the state had not tried to recover the overpayments. On August 20, 2026, the court denied both defense groups’ motions to dismiss the relators’ third amended complaint, after it had dismissed the second amended complaint for failure to plead materiality. On materiality, the court held that, “though it is a close call, materiality is satisfied.” The court also made two other rulings. It adhered to its earlier rulings on falsity, scienter, and causation, again held the Indiana FCA’s public disclosure bar inapplicable, and rejected the constitutional challenge to the qui tam provisions of the FCA.

Executive Summary

From 2011 to 2021, IBM Watson and its corporate predecessors served as the fraud and abuse detection contractor for Indiana’s Medicaid program. In 2016, after a Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) audit, Indiana Medicaid’s Program Integrity team directed IBM to expand its algorithms beyond fee-for-service claims to claims providers submitted to managed care entities (MCEs). The MCEs receive capitated payments from the state, set in part on the basis of the encounter data the MCEs report on the claims they paid. From 2017 to 2021, IBM’s analyses identified claims that, according to the relators, the MCEs paid and the hospitals submitted in violation of billing rules and Medicaid requirements. According to the relators, Indiana Medicaid then paused its efforts to recover the overpayments IBM had identified. 2026 WL 2448954, at *2–3.

John D. McCullough, a former Director of Program Integrity for Indiana Medicaid, and James R. Holden, a former Chief Deputy and General Counsel in the Office of the Indiana State Treasurer, brought a qui tam action under the federal and Indiana FCAs. Id. at *1. The defendants include both MCEs and hospital systems: the “MCE Defendants” (Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc., MDwise, Inc., CareSource Indiana, Inc., and Coordinated Care Corporation) and the “Hospital Defendants” (Indiana University Health, Inc., Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, Community Health Network, Inc., Ascension Health, Inc., Lutheran Health Network, Inc., and Parkview Health System, Inc.). Id.

The court had dismissed the second amended complaint for failure to plead materiality, reasoning that the relators’ own allegations showed that Indiana Medicaid knew of the violations and chose not to act; that complaint attributed the decision not to recoup to “improper political pressure.” Id. at *5. In the third amended complaint, the relators dropped that allegation and alleged instead that an understaffed Program Integrity team and a new director never fully reviewed or understood IBM’s reports. The court accepted those allegations as true, held that they removed the “very strong evidence” against materiality that actual knowledge would supply, and denied both motions. Id. at *8–10. The ruling is an unpublished district court order at the pleading stage. It does not decide whether any claim was false or what Indiana Medicaid actually knew. But it is illustrative of the way lower courts are applying Escobar to determine whether relators are adequately pleading materiality.

Background

The IBM reports and the Program Integrity team

According to the complaint, IBM’s algorithms helped Indiana Medicaid recover millions of dollars a year in fee-for-service overpayments between 2011 and 2016, including more than $8.9 million in 2016. The relators allege that IBM’s ongoing refinement of its algorithms ensured their accuracy, and that fewer than one percent of IBM-based recoupment demands were overturned on appeal from 2011 to 2020. Id. at *2. Adding MCE claims was expected to multiply the number of improper claims IBM found and the amount recovered. Id.

The relators allege the Program Integrity team could not handle that volume. It had four staff members when McCullough became director in 2014. McCullough was told it needed at least a dozen more to pursue recoveries on the MCE findings, and he hired one before he was terminated in early 2017. Program Integrity staff repeatedly told IBM they could not fully review earlier reports, let alone new ones, and McCullough’s replacement had gaps in her understanding of IBM’s analysis. Id. As a result, the team curtailed its plans to recoup based on IBM’s findings. The relators allege that the state stopped because it lacked the staff to pursue the recoveries, not because it doubted that IBM’s findings were accurate. They also allege that the pause was not a change in the law or a formal policy decision, so the defendants could not have believed they had been released from their obligations to avoid, detect, or repay overpayments. Id. Those allegations are aimed at Escobar, under which the government’s continued payment of claims counts strongly against materiality when it pays with actual knowledge that the claims violate applicable rules. The relators’ account is that the state never made an informed decision that the violations did not matter. Medicaid fraud recoveries fell from $12.84 million in 2016 to $7.24 million in 2019. Indiana Medicaid has since reintroduced algorithms targeting the same type of billing violations and obtained recoveries comparable to those in 2016, an allegation that bears on whether the state treats these violations as material. Id.

The alleged violations

Under Indiana’s managed care model, the hospitals submit claims to the MCEs, whose provider agreements require compliance with Medicaid rules, and Indiana Medicaid providers certify compliance as a condition of payment. Id. at *3. IBM’s analyses allegedly found that the MCEs paid tens to hundreds of millions of dollars in claims that broke basic hospital billing rules (such as the rule against billing two separate inpatient stays when a patient is readmitted right away for the same condition), were plainly not payable (services after a patient’s death, duplicates), or violated Medicaid requirements for chiropractic, dental, and opioid treatment. Id. The relators allege the MCEs paid those claims rather than catching them “because they knew reporting higher expenditures in the encounter data they submitted to Indiana Medicaid would allow them to obtain higher capitated payments in subsequent years.” Id. (Encounter data are the records MCEs submit to the state of the claims they paid; the state uses these data in setting future capitation rates.) IBM’s analyses also allegedly found that the Hospital Defendants obtained millions of dollars in Medicaid funds by submitting claims that broke basic hospital billing rules, were plainly not payable, or violated Medicaid requirements for injections. Id.

The relators alleged that the defendants presented false claims and made false statements under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) and (B), and under the Indiana analogs, Ind. Code § 5-11-5.7-2(b)(1) and (2). Id. at *1. The relators did not plead a reverse false claims count under § 3729(a)(1)(G), which would have targeted the defendants’ failure to repay identified overpayments. The state’s failure to recoup therefore matters here only as evidence on materiality, not as a claim in its own right.

The prior dismissal

In the second amended complaint, the relators alleged that Indiana Medicaid curtailed recoupments because of “improper political pressure.” The court read that as a conscious choice to deemphasize correct payment and, under Escobar, as strong evidence that the violations were not material. It gave the relators a “final attempt” to plead materiality. Id. at *5.

Legal Analysis

The court first disposed of the arguments it had previously decided with regard to the second amended complaint, then took up the parties’ competing accounts of what Indiana Medicaid knew, and then decided materiality.

1. The elements the court had already decided

  • The court adhered to its earlier rulings on the other elements. The Hospital Defendants argued that the complaint failed to plead falsity, scienter, materiality, and causation, and failed to satisfy Rule 9(b). The MCE Defendants made the same arguments and added the public disclosure bar and the constitutionality of qui tam. Id. at *4.
    • Other elements. Because the third amended complaint largely repeated the earlier allegations, the court did not disturb its prior rulings on falsity, scienter, and causation, noting that the defendants had preserved their objections. Id.
    • Public disclosure. The court again held the Indiana FCA’s public disclosure bar inapplicable, notwithstanding Seventh Circuit precedent that “the Government’s possession of the information exposing a fraud is alone sufficient to trigger the public-disclosure bar,” Cause of Action v. Chicago Transit Authority, 815 F.3d 267, 275 (7th Cir. 2016), because it remained persuaded that the Indiana Supreme Court would follow the majority of federal circuits. 2026 WL 2448954, at *5.
    • Constitutionality. Absent binding authority, the court agreed with the district courts in the Seventh Circuit and with the other circuits that have upheld the constitutionality of qui tam actions. Id.

2. The materiality issue

  • Inconsistent pleading. The defendants argued that the new allegations do not align with the prior ones. They said the relators were backtracking on their earlier actual-knowledge allegations, and that the third amended complaint undermined the argument that the excessive claims were accepted unknowingly. The defendants noted that the third amended complaint alleges that Program Integrity staff typically reviewed IBM’s findings, that IBM sent more than 1,000 audit letters a year, and that millions were recouped annually. Id. at *6. The Hospital Defendants pointed to the relators’ own July 2020 report showing that IBM’s recoupments were among their highest in 2017, 2018, and 2019, and that Indiana Medicaid chose not to pursue 22 IBM findings, which they argued shows the state reviewed the reports and made choices not to pursue overpayments. Id. at *7. The MCE Defendants argued that the complaint alleges the state always found the violations material, changed its policy, and was too worried about the expense of administrative recoupment, which cannot all be true. Id. at *8.
  • The relators responded that possessing a report is not knowing what is in it. Relying on United States ex rel. Streck v. Eli Lilly & Co., 152 F.4th 816 (7th Cir. 2025), and United States v. Rogan, 517 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 2008), they argued that actual knowledge cannot be imputed to an agency whose officials fail to appreciate the significance of what they are given. 2026 WL 2448954, at *6. The MCE Defendants answered that Streck involved an undisclosed $600 million effect on pricing, while IBM’s reports identified the claims, why they were flagged, and their financial impact. Id. at *7.
  • Each side read the state’s recoupment email as support. The relators relied on an email from the General Counsel of the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration (FSSA) stating that Indiana Medicaid would seek recoupment “if the claims identified in [this] qui tam action are confirmed to be claims that are not legally entitled to payment.” As noted above, Escobar treats repeated payment with actual knowledge as strong evidence against materiality only where the government “has signaled no change in position.” The relators argued that the email was such a signal: whatever the state knew before, it had now said it would recover payments on claims found to be improper. Id. at *7. The defendants read it the other way: the state would act only if a court told it to. Id. at *6. The MCE Defendants added that the statement was not news, because “presumably” Indiana Medicaid has always cared about recoupment. Id. at *8.
  • The State of Indiana weighed in. In a Second Statement of Interest, the state urged a holistic approach to materiality under the Indiana FCA, arguing that “Medicaid is not an ordinary commercial arrangement” and that focusing exclusively on enforcement decisions made “with imperfect information and limited resources” undervalues the harm of false claims. Id. at *8.

3. The court’s materiality analysis

  • An amended pleading supersedes the earlier admissions. The court held that, under Scott v. Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., 725 F.3d 772, 782–83 (7th Cir. 2013), “facts or admissions from an earlier complaint that are not included in a later complaint cannot be considered on a motion to dismiss.” The political-pressure allegation was gone, so the court’s earlier finding of “very strong evidence” against materiality no longer applied. 2026 WL 2448954, at *8.
  • Without actual knowledge, the holistic factors favored materiality. The court held that “[a]bsent actual knowledge by Indiana Medicaid, the holistic view the Court is required to take leads to the conclusion that the alleged false claims were material.” Id. at *9. It relied on Seventh Circuit authority that noncompliance “resulting in large price differentials in how much the government owes” strongly supports materiality, on the requirement that the defendants certify their claims, and on the parallel to United States ex rel. Heath v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 92 F.4th 654 (7th Cir. 2024), where a misrepresentation going to a cost-control program’s purpose was material. Because the purpose of Medicaid managed care is to reduce costs, the court found it “reasonable for the Court to infer that if Indiana Medicaid had known of the actual violations, it would have sought recoupment.” 2026 WL 2448954, at *9. That inference is not a presumption in the relators’ favor. Relators must plead and prove materiality, but they do not have to prove that the government lacked actual knowledge; the government’s knowledge is evidence the defendants offer to show that the violations did not matter. Materiality asks whether a misrepresentation has “a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing,” payment, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4), and looks to “the likely or actual behavior” of the government, Escobar, 579 U.S. at 193 (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as alleged here, the government did not know of the violations, there is no actual behavior to examine, so the court asked what the government likely would have done had it known. The court also noted that a statement can be material “even if those who make the decision are negligent and fail to appreciate the statement’s significance.” 2026 WL 2448954, at *10 (quoting Streck, 152 F.4th at 848 (quoting Rogan, 517 F.3d at 452)).
  • The state’s inaction counts, but it is not dispositive. The court agreed with the defendants that “Indiana Medicaid’s inaction is evidence of immateriality, but that fact alone is not dispositive,” and held that “the mere fact that Indiana Medicaid had the reports does not automatically indicate that they knew or appreciated the reports’ significance such that it defeats materiality.” Id. at *10.
  • The question is whether the claims were material, not whether the reports were. The defendants pointed to the state’s assertions that the IBM reports may be doubtful or speculative. The court responded that “the issue is not whether the IBM reports themselves were material to the government’s payment decision but rather whether the allegedly false claims to the government were material to its payment decision.” Id.

Holding

Both motions to dismiss the third amended complaint were denied. The court adhered to its prior rulings on falsity, scienter, causation, public disclosure, and the constitutionality of qui tam. On materiality, it held that the third amended complaint’s allegations that Indiana Medicaid lacked actual knowledge, which it accepted as true at the pleading stage, together with the amounts alleged, the certification requirement, and the cost-control purpose of Medicaid managed care, sufficiently plead materiality under Escobar. 2026 WL 2448954, at *4–10.

What to Watch

  • Discovery into what Indiana Medicaid knew. The materiality ruling rests on allegations that the Program Integrity team lacked actual knowledge of the falsity of the claims because it did not review or understand IBM’s reports. The defendants have already pointed to evidence that cuts the other way. The relators’ own July 2020 report shows that IBM-based recoupments in 2017, 2018, and 2019 were among the highest of the decade, the same period in which the relators say the state stopped reviewing IBM’s findings, and that Indiana Medicaid chose not to pursue 22 IBM findings during that period. The defendants argue that both facts show the state read the reports and decided which findings to act on. Discovery will test whose account holds.
  • The FSSA’s position on recoupment. The FSSA General Counsel’s email ties recoupment to confirmation that the claims were not payable. If the state begins recouping while the case is pending, that would support the relators’ argument that it has “signaled [a] change in position” under Escobar. If it does not, the defendants will say its inaction speaks for itself.
  • The defendants’ preserved arguments. The defendants preserved their objections on falsity, scienter, and causation for later stages, and the court has now twice rejected their public disclosure and qui tam challenges. The public disclosure question is whether the bar applies when the information behind a relator’s claims was in the government’s hands but was never disclosed to the public. Under Seventh Circuit precedent, the government’s possession of the information is enough to trigger the bar, Cause of Action, 815 F.3d at 275, but the Seventh Circuit has itself indicated that it needs to reconsider that rule, id. at 277. Because the bar at issue here is the Indiana FCA’s, the court predicted that the Indiana Supreme Court would follow the majority of federal circuits, which do not treat the government’s possession alone as a public disclosure. Whether the Seventh Circuit will revisit its rule remains open.

What This Means for Resolving FCA and Payor-Provider Disputes

In most FCA cases, evidence of government knowledge helps the defense. Here, a state contractor’s list of flagged claims became the relators’ evidence of falsity and the defendants’ evidence of immateriality at the same time. The court held that possession of that list is not enough at the pleading stage to establish that the government knew. That keeps the case open, but it also keeps the central fact question, what the state knew and why it did not recoup, unresolved until discovery. Parties tend to wait on a question like that, and the court’s description of materiality as “a close call” gives both sides a reason to.

The case also puts plans and hospitals on the same side of the caption with interests that do not fully line up. The relators’ theory against the MCEs depends on their paying claims that, under the same theory, the hospitals should not have submitted. The MCEs’ provider agreements require compliance with Medicaid rules, so a plan facing exposure for paying a claim may look to the provider that submitted it. The court did not address that allocation, but any global resolution will have to.

Finally, the FSSA has said Indiana Medicaid will seek recoupment if the claims are confirmed not to be payable. That gives the defendants a separate recoupment exposure, limited to the overpayments themselves, while the FCA case adds treble damages and per-claim penalties on top of that amount. An identified-overpayment list gives every party a shared starting figure, which tends to make these cases resolvable. Until the government-knowledge question is answered, though, the parties will value the gap between recoupment and treble damages very differently.

John Libby is an arbitrator, mediator, and settlement counsel with LibbyADR LLC. This post contains his own summaries of the decisions discussed, prepared for general informational purposes only. The summaries are not intended to be a complete statement of any court’s reasoning, nor should they be taken to indicate how he would rule as an arbitrator in any particular case. In addition, the summaries are not legal advice, nor should they be construed as legal advice. Readers should not act on these posts, but should review the decisions themselves and consult with legal counsel.

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FCA Case Spotlight: The Ninth Circuit Holds That a $200 Million HUD Compliance Agreement Was Not an “Alternate Remedy” and Affirms a $38.3 Million Qui Tam Settlement https://libbyadr.com/ling-v-city-of-los-angeles-alternate-remedy-fca-settlement/ https://libbyadr.com/ling-v-city-of-los-angeles-alternate-remedy-fca-settlement/#respond Sat, 17 Oct 2026 20:42:58 +0000 https://libbyadr.com/?p=1709 United States ex rel. Ling v. City of Los Angeles, No. 25-249, ___ F.4th ___, 2026 WL 2871734 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2026) | United States ex rel. Novak v. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., No. 18 C 5452, 2026 WL 2920869 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2026)

False Claims Act · Qui Tam Settlement Approval · Relator Share · Alternate Remedy

Introduction

When the government intervenes in a False Claims Act (FCA) case and settles it, the relator gets 15 to 25 percent of the “proceeds.” The relator will be concerned with both what counts as the “proceeds” and whether the amount is big enough. The relator can object on both grounds: that the settlement is not “fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances,” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B), and that a separate deal between the government and the defendant was an “alternate remedy” in which she should share, id. § 3730(c)(5).

In United States ex rel. Ling v. City of Los Angeles, the relator did both. While the FCA litigation was pending (it concerned whether the City of Los Angeles had misrepresented its compliance with accessible-housing requirements tied to funds from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)), the City agreed with HUD to spend at least $200 million on accessible housing. It later settled the FCA claims for $38,266,989. On September 24, 2026, the Ninth Circuit rejected the relator’s objections and affirmed the district court’s approval of the settlement. First, it held that the HUD agreement, which redressed a different wrong and expressly carved out the FCA claims, was not an alternate remedy because it didn’t take the place of the FCA case. Second, it held that the district court didn’t abuse its discretion in approving a settlement the government built on a benefit-of-the-bargain damages model. Five days later, a federal court in Chicago faced the same basic question under state law (when a government recovery outside the qui tam case entitles the relator to a share) and declined to decide it, leaving it to the state courts.

Executive Summary

Mei Ling and the Fair Housing Council of the San Fernando Valley (FHC) filed a qui tam action in February 2011 alleging that the City had repeatedly misrepresented that it complied with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Fair Housing Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and had received federal housing funds based on those misrepresentations. The United States intervened in July 2017. HUD investigated the same accessibility deficiencies on its own track, and in August 2019 the City entered into a Voluntary Compliance Agreement (VCA) committing it to spend at least $200 million over ten years to remediate or build accessible housing. The VCA expressly excluded the FCA claims. The FCA case went on for five more years, and in June 2024 the government, FHC and the City settled it for $38,266,989.

Ling objected to the settlement. She argued that the VCA was an alternate remedy she was entitled to share in, and that the FCA settlement was too low as measured against the government’s earlier damages calculation of more than $500 million and a $100 million offer she said the City made in 2016. The district court approved the settlement after a fairness hearing.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that a separate agreement is an alternate remedy only if it takes the place of the FCA suit, and that the VCA didn’t, chiefly because it redressed a different wrong: the City’s underlying civil rights violations, not its alleged false certifications of compliance. On the FCA settlement amount, it held that the government’s damages methodology, the litigation risk the City’s summary judgment motion exposed, and the deference owed to the government under United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc., 599 U.S. 419 (2023), supported approval.

In United States ex rel. Novak v. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., decided five days later, a relator who had sued Walgreens on behalf of the United States and 29 States sought a share of a separate multistate opioid settlement that, according to the States, resolved some of his state Medicaid claims. He argued that the States’ settlement was an alternate remedy or, alternatively, a settlement of his own action. The district court didn’t decide either question. Because the federal claims had settled, and because his share claims arise under each State’s own false claims statute on questions no State’s courts have answered, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and left the claims to the courts of each of the settling States.

Background

Why the HUD agreement matters: two tracks, one set of deficiencies

Ling’s alternate-remedy argument depended on how the HUD agreement related to her FCA case. The two proceedings grew out of the same accessibility deficiencies, and for a time the City tried to resolve them together.

HUD opened its own investigation into the City’s compliance with federal accessibility requirements in 2011, the same year Ling filed suit, and issued a Letter of Findings of non-compliance in January 2012. Ling, 2026 WL 2871734, at *2. By 2016, the City was trying to resolve both matters in a single deal. In a September 2016 letter to the HUD Secretary, City officials wrote that “[t]o enter into a VCA, the City must also settle the related False Claims Act” action, and that they had thought the City was “on the verge of a settlement agreement, under which DOJ, through HUD, would allow $92 million of DOJ’s calculated actual damages for the FCA claims to be used to carry out the remediation of thousands of the City’s housing units.” Id. at *3. That global deal never happened.

By then DOJ was already litigating the FCA case; it had intervened in July 2017. Two months later, in September 2017, HUD referred its separate civil rights compliance matter to DOJ “for potential further enforcement.” Id. The City asked to restart settlement negotiations with HUD, and DOJ “deferred jurisdiction,” leaving the civil rights matter with HUD. Id. In July 2019, HUD told the City it intended to withhold approximately $80 million in federal housing funds, and the VCA followed the next month. The agreement the City actually signed was not a global settlement, unlike the 2016 proposal: it resolved only the City’s civil rights violations, committing the City to a program “with a value that averages a minimum of $20 million per year” for ten years, and specifically carved out the FCA litigation, stating that it “does not, and shall not be construed to, resolve any claims that have been or could be asserted in” the qui tam action. Id.

The FCA settlement

The government and the City conducted what the court called “voluminous fact discovery” through November 2023. The City moved for summary judgment on March 1, 2024, and made a settlement offer at a mediation four days later. Multiple levels of DOJ and City officials approved the written terms, and the parties signed in June 2024. The district court approved the settlement after a fairness hearing in August 2024 and, in October 2024, dismissed the claims, recognizing that Ling and FHC would “receive at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent” of the proceeds. Id. Ling’s entitlement to a share of the $38.3 million was not in dispute. Id. at *2. The court resolved her challenges to the denial of an evidentiary hearing and limited discovery and to the denial of her motion to alter or amend the judgment, as well as her request for sanctions, in a memorandum disposition filed the same day. Id. at *2 n.1.

The same alternate-remedy question under state law: Novak

Novak asked the same question as Ling (when does a government recovery outside the qui tam case entitle the relator to a share?), but the court ultimately left it to the state courts. A pharmacist sued Walgreens on behalf of the United States and 29 States over controlled-substance prescriptions billed to Medicare and Medicaid. While his complaint was under seal, Walgreens signed a separate opioid agreement with 46 States requiring it to pay more than $4.7 billion over fifteen years for abatement and treatment programs, none of it allocated to the States’ Medicaid programs. Novak, 2026 WL 2920869, at *1. In December 2023, the States intervened to dismiss his state Medicaid claims, telling the court that the multistate agreement “resolved certain of the claims that Relator brings in this case.” Id. at *2. With Novak’s agreement, they postponed the question of whether he was entitled to a share “pursuant to the alternate remedy provisions of each state’s respective false claims act, or other applicable law.” Id. at *2, *6. The United States later settled for $300 million, split evenly between $150 million in Controlled Substances Act penalties, in which relators do not share, and $150 million in FCA damages, of which the relator received 17.25 percent. Id. at *2; Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 1.D, 2, Novak, No. 18 C 5452 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2025), ECF No. 69.

Novak then sought a share of the multistate settlement from 28 States. He argued that the States had in substance settled his action; the States answered that the multistate agreement resolved consumer-protection and public-nuisance claims he could not have brought, in proceedings to which he was not a party. Novak, 2026 WL 2920869, at *7. Several also argued that it was not an alternate remedy: that settlements funding prospective opioid abatement are not the type of claim a false claims statute reaches, that Novak contributed nothing to a deal signed while his complaint was still sealed, and, for some States, that their statutes have no alternate-remedy provision or a narrower one than the federal statute. Id. at *8–10. Novak replied that the agreement released his claims and conditioned payment on their dismissal. Id. at *8. The court did not decide who was right. It held that whether a State “proceeds with” a relator’s action when it settles related claims outside the action, and whether such a settlement is an alternate remedy, are questions of each State’s statute that no State’s courts have answered, that the federal decisions point in different directions, and that the answers may differ from State to State. Id. at *7–8. With the federal claims gone, it declined supplemental jurisdiction and left those questions to the States’ courts. It rejected Novak’s argument that the States’ agreement to defer the question committed them to the federal forum: “An agreement to defer a question,” the court wrote, “is not an agreement on its answer, and it is not an agreement to the forum.” Id. at *6.

Legal Analysis

The Ninth Circuit decided two questions in response to the relator’s challenge to the settlement: whether the VCA was an alternate remedy in which Ling could share, and whether the $38.3 million the government accepted for the FCA claims was fair, adequate and reasonable.

1. Was the VCA an alternate remedy?

  • To share in another proceeding, the relator must show that the alternate remedy took the place of the FCA remedy. Section 3730(c)(5) lets the government “pursue its claim through any alternate remedy,” and gives the relator “the same rights in such proceeding as such person would have had if the action had continued.” The court read that language, as the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have, to assume the other proceeding replaces the qui tam action. Ling, 2026 WL 2871734, at *4 (citing United States ex rel. LaCorte v. Wagner, 185 F.3d 188, 191–92 (4th Cir. 1999), and United States ex rel. Babalola v. Sharma, 746 F.3d 157, 161–62 (5th Cir. 2014)). A relator therefore shares in an outside recovery only if it substitutes for the FCA remedy. The court added that this can happen even while the FCA suit is still pending, that the question “involves a fact-intensive evaluation,” and that “collusion or bad faith” can bear on it. Id. at *5.
  • The key point: the VCA and the FCA settlement redressed different wrongs. “Significantly,” the court said, “the purposes of the VCA and FCA settlement were different.” Id. at *6. The VCA addressed the City’s “failure to comply with accessible housing requirements.” The FCA settlement resolved allegations that the City “falsely certified that it had complied with those obligations.” Id. Because the “claim” in § 3730(c)(5) is the false claim, the court followed United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Novo A/S, 5 F.4th 47 (D.C. Cir. 2021), in treating the VCA as resolving “a different legal claim altogether.” Ling, 2026 WL 2871734, at *6 (quoting Kennedy, 5 F.4th at 56).
  • For the same reason, the VCA’s nonmonetary value wasn’t enough. The court agreed that an alternate remedy can carry nonmonetary value under United States ex rel. Barajas v. United States, 258 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001). Ling, 2026 WL 2871734, at *6. But the VCA “redresses the City’s present violations and prevents future violations,” while the FCA settlement “redresses the City’s past fraud.” Id. at *7. The court rejected Ling’s argument that the government couldn’t recover FCA damages for a loss the VCA made good, because the City’s remedial work did “not nullify the Government’s losses due to misrepresentations, unjust enrichment, and payment by mistake.” Id.
  • The court distinguished Barajas. In Barajas, an Air Force agreement with Northrop was held to be an alternate remedy. The Ling court identified two differences. Id. at *5–6.
    • Preclusion. Claim preclusion barred the Barajas relator’s second suit, and the government got its relief through the Air Force agreement instead. Here nothing in the VCA stopped the case, which went forward to “a $38 million settlement.” Id. at *5.
    • Carve-out versus credit. The Barajas agreement let Northrop use it in “any civil proceeding” to “obtain appropriate credit” for what it paid. The VCA carved the FCA claims out. Id. at *6.
  • The record showed no collusion. The FCA litigation continued for five years after the VCA. The court reasoned that colluding parties would have settled “shortly after entering the VCA and for much less,” and that “[t]he active participation of an experienced mediator during the settlement process further undermines any allegation of collusion.” Id.

2. Was the $38.3 million settlement fair, adequate and reasonable?

Having held that Ling had no claim to a share of the VCA, the court turned to her second objection: that the amount the government accepted for the FCA claims was too low.

  • Review was for abuse of discretion. Because § 3730(c)(2)(B)’s “fair, adequate, and reasonable” test mirrors Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2), the court applied the class-action standard of review, as the Seventh Circuit did in United States ex rel. Robinson v. HealthNet Inc., 124 F.4th 511, 519 (7th Cir. 2024). The parties agreed on that standard. Ling, 2026 WL 2871734, at *4 & n.3.
  • Deference to the government frames the review. Because “the injury [relators] assert is exclusively to the Government,” the government is afforded deference when it settles a qui tam case. Id. at *7 (quoting Polansky, 599 U.S. at 425).
  • The settlement amount was measured against the government’s method, not the offer history. Ling’s 2016 benchmark was a $100 million offer she said the City made that year. The parties disputed whether that offer was ever made, and the court found the evidence of it “limited.” The court called the question “irrelevant” because the government explained how the settlement amount was derived at the fairness hearing. Id. at *8.
    • Benefit of the bargain. The government compared the value of the City’s existing affordable housing with the value of the affordable and accessible housing the City would have built had it complied. Because most of the defects concerned mobility, it focused on the requirement that at least five percent of multifamily housing be accessible for mobility impairment. That produced $26,800,000 in damages plus “a multiplier sum of $11,466,989,” which together equal the settlement. The government “reserv[ed] its right to reconsider the calculation of damages.” Id.
    • Public policy. The City “repeatedly told the United States that each dollar it paid in settlement is a dollar that it must find in its budget.” The court held the government could weigh that, because its interests “are not confined to maximizing recovery against the defendant.” Id. (quoting United States v. Everglades College, Inc., 855 F.3d 1279, 1288 (11th Cir. 2017), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Republic of Honduras, 75 F.4th 1288 (11th Cir. 2023)).
  • The litigation risk analysis had evolved since 2016. Ling argued that the government’s position had improved since 2016, when it defeated the City’s motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit pointed to the arguments in the City’s March 2024 summary judgment motion, which the case settled before the court decided: that its certifications were not material to HUD and that the government could not prove scienter or causation. It also cited the district court’s assessment, in approving the settlement, that even if the government’s claims survived summary judgment, “the Government faces an onerous task to establish the FCA claims at trial.” Id. at *8. Those arguments, the court said, were not “known at the time the City made its [alleged] $100 million offer in 2016,” because the City didn’t move for summary judgment until 2024. Id. The district court also found that the number was reached “after extensive investigation and negotiation over the course of nine years and two mediations.” Id. With that, and the principle that “the very essence of a settlement is compromise, a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes,” Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Commission of the City and County of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir. 1982), the court found no abuse of discretion. Ling, 2026 WL 2871734, at *8.

Holding

Affirmed. Under these circumstances, the HUD VCA did not take the place of the FCA suit or the FCA settlement and was not an alternate remedy under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5). The district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the $38,266,989 settlement as fair, adequate and reasonable under § 3730(c)(2)(B). In Novak, the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) and (c)(3) and dismissed the relator’s share claims without prejudice to their assertion in the courts of the respective States, without deciding whether the multistate agreement was an alternate remedy or a settlement of his action.

What to Watch

  • Further review in Ling. Absent a rehearing petition, a petition for certiorari would be due 90 days after judgment, on or about December 23, 2026.
  • When a parallel agreement could count as an alternate remedy. Ling lost on facts the court listed: the VCA addressed a different wrong, carved out the FCA claims, gave the City no credit against FCA liability, and was followed by five more years of FCA litigation. But the court also said a parallel agreement can take the place of the FCA remedy even while the qui tam case is still pending, and that collusion or bad faith bears on the question. A relator facing a parallel agreement that releases or credits the FCA claims, or that is followed quickly by a small FCA settlement, would have a stronger argument. Expect relators’ counsel to focus on those features.
  • The fairness-hearing record. Because approval is reviewed for abuse of discretion, the government’s explanation of its damages method at the fairness hearing is likely to carry most of the weight on appeal.
  • State-court share litigation after Novak. The share claims now go to state courts, under statutes that, the court noted, differ on whether they have an alternate-remedy provision at all. The first decisions will show whether federal cases like Kennedy carry over.

What This Means for Resolving False Claims Act Disputes

Ling shows how an FCA settlement number gets built and defended. The government didn’t defend $38.3 million by pointing to the history of offers. It defended it with a damages theory it could explain at a hearing (single damages plus a stated multiplier), a reservation of other methodologies, the cost of a larger number to a public defendant, and litigation risk that surfaced only in the City’s summary judgment motion. The earlier offers, the district court found, “were made in an entirely different context.” For relator’s counsel, that means an objection built on a superseded damages estimate or an old offer runs into deference to the government; the methodology itself is the better target. For defense counsel, the City’s summary judgment motion and its budget argument (a variant of the ability-to-pay argument defendants often raise) both ended up in the record that sustained the number. For the government, the lesson is to put the method, not just the figure, on the record.

The alternate-remedy holding speaks to parallel administrative resolutions. A compliance agreement that redresses the underlying regulatory violation rather than the false claim, carves out the FCA claims and gives no credit against FCA exposure stays separate from the relator’s recovery. The five-year gap between the two resolutions reinforced the point. Novak shows what happens when the relator’s share in a parallel resolution is left for later: the agreement to defer didn’t keep the question in federal court. Resolving the relator’s share at the same time as the number gives everyone a shared reference point. Leaving it open sends it to another forum, or in Novak, to many of them.

John Libby is an arbitrator, mediator, and settlement counsel with LibbyADR LLC. This post contains his own summaries of the decisions discussed, prepared for general informational purposes only. The summaries are not intended to be a complete statement of any court’s reasoning, nor should they be taken to indicate how he would rule as an arbitrator in any particular case. In addition, the summaries are not legal advice, nor should they be construed as legal advice. Readers should not act on these posts, but should review the decisions themselves and consult with legal counsel.

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